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COMMENT
TAMING THE SUPREME COURT
Martin Wishnatskyt
When from yon mysterious vault, the enrobed nine send forth
their tomes . . . when essaying some new constitutional

construction, as they call their attacks upon the rights of the States
and their citizens, we are taught to bow without question, as the
faithful to the decrees of the Grand Lama.'

I love judges and I love courts .... They are my ideals. They typify
on earth what we shall meet hereafterin heaven under ajust God.2
I. INTRODUCTION

Is the Supreme Court an out-of-control policymaking institution
ravishing the ideal of self-government enshrined in the Constitution? Some
think so.' To see if their claims are true, we first return in Part II to the
t Editorial Board, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEW. J.D. Candidate (2012), Liberty
University School of Law; Ph.D. (1975), Harvard University; A.B. (1966), Harvard College.
Special thanks to Mark Hicks and Daniel Schmid for shepherding this Comment through the
editorial process, and to Judge Paul Spinden and my classmate Kevin Novak for constructive
criticism of earlier drafts.
1. 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1856-1918), at
57 (1922) (quoting remarks of Rep. Philemon Bliss (R-Ohio) on the House floor (Feb. 7,
1859)).
2. Paul D. Carrington, Checks and Balances: Congress and the Federal Courts, in
REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 137, 147 (Roger C.
Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006) (quoting then Presidential candidate and later
Chief Justice, William Howard Taft).
3. "Since the advent of the modern Court in 1937, constitutional 'interpretation' by the
Court had become self-consciously a matter of judicial legislation, employing a balancing
approach (that is, an essentially discretionary power) to read policies into key constitutional
provisions." CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 291 (1986). A century ago, one jurist
acknowledged that judges "base their judgments upon broad considerations of policy to
which the traditions of the bench would hardly have tolerated a reference fifty years ago."
OLIVER WENDELL HOMES, THE COMMON LAW 78 (1909). See also Anthony Lewis, A Man Born
to Act, Not to Muse, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 30, 1968, at 49 ("Earl Warren is the closest thing
that the United States has had to a Platonic Guardian, dispensing law from a throne without
any sensed limits of power except what is seen as the good of society."); RAOUL BERGER,
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eighteenth century to see what the Framers and Ratifiers of the Constitution
had in mind when they composed and accepted the document as the
governing charter for a new nation. Then, in Part III, we take a step into the
nineteenth century to see what the Civil War amendments signified. In Part
IV, we arrive at the present day, surveying the reality that Supreme Court
decision-making mirrors the legislative process. Part V addresses proposals
to reform the institution to curb its legislative forays.
Those who are familiar with the origins of judicial review as a limited
mandate to police the Constitution may wish to skim Part II to refresh their
understanding. Part III provides a history of the Fourteenth Amendment to
demonstrate that the Framers intended to apply the Bill of Rights to the
states through the Privileges or Immunities Clause and assigned to
Congress, not the Courts, the express power of enforcing it. Following the
historical sections, Part IV demonstrates that the Supreme Court has
become a second legislature, dominating the one assigned this power by
Article I of the Constitution. Part V, the remedies section, analyzes
alternatives for reigning in the Court's unauthorized invasion of the
legislative power, concluding that the best solution is a constitutional
amendment requiring consent of seven justices for the Court to invalidate a
state or federal law as unconstitutional.
II. WHAT WAS THE FOUNDERS' MANDATE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW?

The Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States in "one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish."' The Supreme Court has appellate
jurisdiction over all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the
United States.' The Court also has original jurisdiction in a small number of
cases.6 Congress has power to make exceptions and to regulate the Court's
appellate jurisdiction.' Where federal law, constitutional or statutory,
conflicts with state law, federal law prevails.' The Constitution specifically
requires state court judges to enforce federal law, "any Thing in the
DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE (1982) ("[Tlhe Court assumed

power to alter and amend the Constitution, a power exclusively reserved to the people
themselves, a power usurped by the Court disguised in soothing double-talk.").
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
5. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, 2.
6. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party").
7. Id.("with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make").
8. See id. art. VI, cl. 2 ("supreme Law of the Land").
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Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding."' The
jurisdiction and powers of the federal judiciary, and the duties of state
courts under the Constitution and laws of the United States, arise from
these provisions.
A. JudicialReview by the States and of the States
Although the Constitution does not say expressly that federal courts may
review congressional or state laws for constitutionality, Article VI does
mandate judicial review of state laws in state courts for conformity to the
U.S. Constitution. In the states, the Constitution is not merely a hortatory
or visionary document, but supreme law that judges are "bound" to apply to
all cases otherwise properly before them for decision in which relief is
sought pursuant to its provisions."o A strong, but not inevitable, implication
of the "arising under" jurisdiction is that the Supreme Court may review
decisions of state courts that turn on federal questions." This provision,
however, may also possibly be construed to apply only to cases arising in
federal courts. Thus, without the establishment by Congress of inferior
federal courts, the Supreme Court theoretically could be limited to its
modest original jurisdiction.
1. Alexander Hamilton
The need to clarify the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over
final decisions of state courts on federal questions did not escape the
attention of the writers of the Federalist Papers. Relying on the phrase "all
cases," Alexander Hamilton determined that "an appeal would certainly lie
from the [state courts] to the Supreme Court of the United States.""
The constitution in direct terms gives an appellate jurisdiction to
the supreme court in all the enumerated cases of federal
cognizance, in which it is not to have an original one, without a
single expression to confine its operation to the inferior federal
courts. The objects of appeal, not the tribunals from which it is to
be made, are alone contemplated. From this circumstance, and

9. Id.
10. Id. ("the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby").
11.
12.
13.

See id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
See supra note 6.
THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton).
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from the reason of the thing, it ought to be construed to extend
to the state tribunals.14
Considering that the phrase "all cases" is unqualified, Hamilton here
construed the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to include federal
cases arising in state courts. Otherwise, the Constitution would be subject to
a different construction in each state, and "the judiciary authority of the
union may be eluded at the pleasure of every plaintiff or prosecutor."" He
further stated:
The evident aim of the plan of the convention is, that all the
causes of the specified classes shall, for weighty public reasons,
receive their original or final determination in the courts of the
union. To confine, therefore, the general expressions which give
appellate jurisdiction to the supreme court, to appeals from the
subordinate federal courts, instead of allowing their extension to
the state courts, would be to abridge the latitude of the terms, in
subversion of the intent, contrary to every sound rule of
interpretation.' 6
The lack of any express limit on the cases subject to appeal in the
Supreme Court, and "the reason of the thing," namely the "avowed
purposes of the proposed government" to create a workable union that
would not be embarrassed in its measures, combined to establish the power
of the U.S. Supreme Court to hear appeals of federal questions decided in
state courts. Hamilton further elaborated: "The mere necessity of
uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws, decides the question.
Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes,
arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from which nothing
but contradiction and confusion can proceed.""
2.

James Madison

James Madison, though not a political ally of Hamilton," shared his view
of the unifying role of the federal judiciary. "A paramount or even a
14. Id.

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).

18. For their political differences, see Colleen A. Sheehan, Madison v. Hamilton: The
Battle over Republicanism and the Role of Public Opinion, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 405 (2004).
"[Tihe divergence between us took place - from [Hamilton] wishing ... to administer the
Government into what he thought it ought to be; while, on my part, I endeavored to make it
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definitive Authority in the individual States," he wrote, "would soon make
the Constitution & laws different in different States, and thus destroy that
equality & uniformity of rights & duties which form the essence of the
Compact.. .. "" Madison expressed this view publicly on January 16,
1788,20 only four months after the signing of the Constitution." The
federalist system proposed by the Constitution, he argued, necessitated an
arbiter to adjudicate the line of demarcation between the power of the
national government and that of the states. "[In controversies relating to
the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately
to decide, is to be established under the general government." 22 Although
this tribunal must decide impartially "according to the rules of the
constitution," its establishment "is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to
the sword, and a dissolution of the compact...." 2 3 That such a tribunal
could be safely established only under the general government "is a position
not likely to be combated."24 Writing to Thomas Jefferson thirty-five years
later, he reiterated that judicial review of state law on constitutional
questions was the "prevailing view of the subject when the Constitution was
adopted & put into execution," and that he personally had "never yielded
my original opinion indicated in the 'Federalist' No. 39 ....
Several years later, at the age of seventy-eight, 26 Madison conveyed the
same point in unmistakable terms. Except in the case of unavoidable resort
to revolution, "there is & must be an Arbiter or Umpire in the
conform to the Constitution...." N.P. Trist: Memoranda (Sept. 27, 1834) (statement of
James Madison), in 3 REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 534 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) [hereinafter REcORDs].
19. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 27, 1823), in 9 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 137, 141 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) [hereinafter WRITINGS]. See also Letter
from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Sept. 7, 1829), in WRITINGS, supra at 346, 349
(speaking of "the necessity of a definitive power on questions between the U.S. and the
individual States, and the necessity of its being lodged in the former, where alone it could
preserve the essential uniformity").
20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison).
21. U.S. CONST. art. VII ("done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States
present the Seventeenth Day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand seven
hundred and Eighty seven. . .. ").
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 27, 1823), in WRITINGS,
supra note 19, at 137, 142.
26. James
Madison
(1751-1836),
THE
PAPERS
OF
JAMES
MADISON,
http://www.virginia.edu/pjm/biographyl.htm (last visited Mar. 9,2012).
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constitutional authority provided for deciding questions concerning the
boundaries of right & power. The particular provision, in the Constitution
of the U.S. is in the authority of the Supreme Court, as stated in the
'Federalist,' No. 39."27 Three years later, now eighty-one,28 Madison again
confirmed his words penned over four decades earlier: "My view of the
supremacy of the [federal] court when the [Constitution] was under
discussion will be found in the Federalist." 29
As Madison recalled, the Convention had considered three "modes" to
control state laws: "1. A Veto on the passage of the State Laws. 2. A
Congressional repeal of them. 3. A Judicial annulment of them."30 Because
of the difficulty for Congress effectively to monitor for constitutionality "the
multiplicity of state laws" across a large country, the Convention chose the
mode of judicial annulment by litigation of aggrieved parties "as now
provided by the Constitution."31
I have never ceased to think that this supremacy was a vital
principle of the Constitution as it is a prominent feature in its
text. A supremacy of the Constitution & laws of the Union,
without a supremacy in the exposition and execution of them,
would be as much a mockery as a scabbard put into the hand of a
Soldier without a sword in it. I have never been able to see, that
without such a view of the subject the Constitution itself could be
the supreme law of the land; or that the uniformity of the Federal
Authority throughout the parties to it could be preserved; or that
without this uniformity, anarchy & disunion could be
prevented.32
3. Virginia Challenges the Judiciary Act of 1789
The Judiciary Act of 1789, codifying the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction over state courts, resolved any latent ambiguity about the
27. Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Sept. 7, 1829), in WRITINGS, supra
note 19, at 346, 351. See also Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist (Feb. 15, 1830), in
WRITINGS, supra note 19, at 353, 353 n.1 (Supreme Court, as final decider of controversies
between the federal and state governments, "is a vital element, a sine qua non, in an efficient
& permanent [government.]").
28. See supra note 26.
29. Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Dec. 27, 1832), in WRITINGS, supra
note 19, at 492-93.
30. Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist (Dec. 1831), in WRITINGS, supra note 19, at
471,473.

31. Id.
32. Id. at 476.
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authority of the Supreme Court to review final decisions of state courts."
Should state judges find federal laws invalid, state laws "repugnant" to the
Constitution, or construe federal law against a party, the decisions "may be
re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United
States upon a writ of error.

... ""

Only matters of federal law may be

appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court from a final disposition in state court."
Claiming that Section 25 of the Judiciary Act was an unconstitutional
intrusion on state sovereignty, the Virginia Supreme Court in 1813 refused
to obey a mandate from the U.S. Supreme Court.36 The Court argued that
the power to remove cases from state to federal court sufficed to ensure
uniformity of interpretations of federal law. 37 The Virginia Supreme Court
recognized the supremacy of federal law in its own court, but denied that
one sovereign could review the decisions of another.
Justice Story's opinion, answering these contentions, insisted, like
Hamilton, that the appellate power was plenary, extending to all cases. 39 If
the jurisdiction were to reach all cases, but could not review cases from state
courts, then the federal courts must perforce have exclusive jurisdiction
over federal questions.40 But the Constitution through the Supremacy
Clause precludes this eventuality.4 1 Because the U.S. Supreme Court must
have appellate jurisdiction over state courts in order to extend its power, as
granted in the Constitution, to all cases arising under the Constitution and
laws of the United States, the Judiciary Act of 1789, specifically designating
the means of exercising this authority, "is supported by the letter and spirit
of the Constitution."4 2 Story explains:

33. The Judiciary Act was "passed by the first congress assembled under the
constitution, many of whose members had taken part in framing that instrument, and is
contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its true meaning." Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co.,
127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888) (citation omitted), overruled in part by Milwaukee Cnty. v. M. E.
White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1993). Of the ten senators on the committee to draft the bill, five
had been delegates to the Philadelphia Convention. Charles Warren, New Light on the
History of the FederalJudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 57 (1923).
34. The Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, 9 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86.
35. Id.
36. Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1813).
37. Id. at 15-16
38. Id. at 58 (holding that "the appellate power of the Supreme Court of the United
States, does not extend to this court").
39. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 339-41 (1816).
40. Id.
41. Id.

42. Id. at 351.
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The appellate power is not limited by the terms of the third
article to any particular courts.... It is the case, then, and not the
court, that gives the jurisdiction. If the judicial power extends to
the case, it will be in vain to search in the letter of the
Constitution for any qualification as to the tribunal where it
depends....
. . . We find no clause in [the Constitution] which limits this
power; and we dare not interpose a limitation where the people
have not been disposed to create one."
Story also noted the "historical fact" that federal appellate power over state
courts was widely recognized as a feature of the Constitution during the
period of ratification, and had been exercised without a breath of judicial
doubt prior to Virginia's act of refusal."
Although the Virginia Supreme Court was correct that "the residuary
sovereignty of the states[] [is] not less inviolable, than the delegated
sovereignty of the United States," 45 the presence of an unlimited
enumerated appellate power over "all cases"" reasonably displaces the
sovereignty of the state judiciary on dispositive questions of federal law. The
power of judicial review that Article VI granted to the states subjects them
to a comparable review by the U.S. Supreme Court under Article III. As
Madison stated, resort to the Supreme Court as the final authority in
determining the constitutionality of state law "is expressed by the articles
declaring that the federal Constitution & laws shall be the supreme law of
the land, and that the Judicial Power of the U. S. shall extend to all cases
arising under them.""

43. Id. at 338, 351.
44. Id. at 351-52.
45. Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 9 (1813). See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James
Madison) (stating that jurisdiction of the proposed government "extends to certain
enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty over all other objects").
46. U.S. CoNST. art III, § 2, cl. 1.
47. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 27, 1823), in WRITINGS, supra
note 19, at 142. For further analysis, see C. Perry Patterson, James Madison and Judicial
Review, 28 CAL. L. REv. 22, 33 (1939) (documenting Madison's view that judicial review "was
intentionally and deliberately granted to the courts in specific clauses of the Constitution").

20121

TAMING THE SUPREME COURT

605

B. JudicialReview of Congress
Chief Justice John Marshall did not invent judicial review of federal
legislation in Marbury v. Madison;"8 he merely carried out the recognized
intent of the Founders.49 Federalist and anti-Federalist writers alike
acknowledged the power of the Supreme Court to declare federal laws
unconstitutional, the first group with sober approbation" and the second
with undisguised outrage." The specific requirement that state judges
enforce the Constitution signaled the necessity that federal judges do the
same. If state laws had to bow to the new Constitution, would federal laws
be exempt? Would the federal Constitution be the supreme law in the states,
but not in the national government?52
Many observers puzzle at this "countermajoritarian" 3 institution planted
at the heart of the Constitution. The Framers, however, feared that the
legislature might devour property rights." They created the Senate and the
Presidential veto to counter the popular voice in the House of
Representatives," and the Supreme Court to crush with finality-and with
48. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). "Those who hold that the framers of the Constitution
did not intend to establish judicial control over federal legislation sometimes assert that
Marshall made the doctrine out of whole cloth and had no precedents or authority to guide
him. This is misleading." CHARLES A. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION

115 (1912).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 59-81.
50. Id.
51. "[T]o consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions [is] a
very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an
oligarchy." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William C. Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), 12 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 162 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905).

52. See Edward S. Corwin, Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of JudicialReview, 12
MICH. L. REV. 538, 564 n.74 (1914) (asking "where the State courts get their power to pass on
the validity of acts of Congress save as it is intrinsic to judicial power under a constitution
regarded as law").
53. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
54.

CHARLES WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 78

(1925) (stating that "the more conservative men in the community . . . took the lead in
seeking the adoption of a new frame of government"). Asserting that "the public liberty [is]
in greater danger from Legislative usurpations than from any other source," Gouverneur
Morris at the Philadelphia Convention itemized the anticipated depredations: "emissions of
paper money, largesses to the people-a remission of debts and similar measures." 2
RECORDS 76, 299. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison) (commenting on the

"pestilent effects of paper money").
55. James Madison endorsed division of the legislature "into different branches . . . . to
guard against dangerous encroachments." THE FEDERALIST No. 51. He considered the Senate
"a salutary check on .... schemes of usurpation or perfidy" and "a defense to the people
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no recourse except by impeachments 6-any popular enthusiasms that
transcended the grant of power in Article I. The Supreme Court is a
massive anti-democratic element deliberately designed to restrain the
popular will and direct it into predetermined channels."
1. Madison, Hamilton and Judicial Review of Congress
Both Madison and Hamilton asserted and defended the necessity of
judicial review of federal legislation." Will not the prohibition against
Congress passing ex post facto laws,o Madison asked, "oblige the judges to
declare such interference null & void?"' Defending the proposed
Constitution, Madison answered those who feared that the "necessary and

against their own temporary errors and delusions." THE FEDERALIST Nos. 62 & 63. Edmund
Randolph of Virginia recommended "a good Senate" to check "the turbulence and follies of
democracy." 1 RECORDS 51. Alexander Hamilton commended the presidential veto as "a
salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the
effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may
happen to influence a majority of that body." THE FEDERALIST No. 73.
56. "This is the only provision on the point which is consistent with the necessary
independence of the judicial character, and is the only one which we find in our own
Constitution in respect to our own judges." THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton).
57. "Instead of being uncontrollable, the legislative authority is placed, as it ought to be,
under just and strict control. The effects of its extravagancies may be prevented, sometimes
by the executive, sometimes by the judicial authority of governments...."1 COLLECTED
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 572 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007). One careful
scholar concludes: "A growing popular sentiment was disgusted with legislators and wanted
to check them and to that end was willing to make the courts paramount." Edward S.
Corwin, Book Review, 7 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 330, 332 (1913) (reviewing CHARLES A. BEARD,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1912)).

58. "Since to resist a majority the judiciary must be independent of that majority, the
character of judicial review is properly antidemocratic." George Mace, The Antidemocratic
CharacterofJudicialReview, 60 CAL. L. REv. 1140, 1149 (1972).
59. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that judicial tenure
during good behavior is an "excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the
representative body"). See also id. (noting "the rights of the courts to pronounce legislative
acts void"); id. (reiterating that "the courts were designed to be an intermediate body
between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter
within the limits assigned to their authority"); THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)
(explaining that judicial review is essential "to set bounds to the legislative discretion"); THE
FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison) (stating that "it is against the enterprising ambition of
[the legislative] department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all
their precautions").
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
61. 2 RECORDS, supranote 18, at 440.
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proper" clause 62 would permit Congress to exercise unwarranted powers:
"In the first instance, the success of the usurpation will depend on the
executive and judiciary departments, which are to expound and give effect
to the legislative acts[.]" 63
Speaking of the mutual relations among the "coordinate" branches of the
federal government, "each equally bound to support the Constitution,"
Madison noted that "the judicial department most familiarizes itself to the
public attention as the expositor, by the order of its functions in relation to
the other departments; and attracts most the public confidence by the
composition of the tribunal."' The judiciary, reviewing legislation after its
enactment, thus acts as the final expositor. Madison endorsed this happy
sequence of events.
It is the judicial department in which questions of
constitutionality, as well as of legality, generally find their
ultimate discussion and operative decision: and the public
deference to and confidence in the judgment of the body are
peculiarly inspired by the qualities implied in its members; by the
gravity and deliberation of their proceedings; and by the
advantage their plurality gives them over the unity of the
Executive department, and their fewness over the multitudinous
composition of the legislative department."
For these reasons, Madison had full confidence in the judiciary as
enforcer of the Constitution. "[I]t may always be expected that the judicial
bench, when happily filled, will, for the reasons suggested, most engage the
respect and reliance of the public as the surest expositor of the
Constitution [.]"66
Hamilton argued that constitutional limits on the legislature necessitated
judicial review. "Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no
other way than through the medium of courts of justice; whose duty it must
be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution
void.""7 He further stated: "A constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded
by the judges as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain
62. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison).
64. Letter from James Madison to Mr. --- (1834), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON: 1829-1836, at 349 (1884).

65. Id. at 349-50.
66. Id. at 350.
67.

THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the
legislative body." If the two are irreconcilable, judges should prefer the will
of the people declared in the Constitution to that of the legislature
expressed in the statute. 9 Professor Edwin Corwin wrote that Hamilton was
"endeavoring to reproduce the matured conclusions of the Convention
itself . .. thus notifying those to whom the Constitution had been referred
for ratification the grounds upon which its framers and supporters based
the case for judicial review.""o
2. The Federal Convention
Hamilton's argument for judicial review finds support in the statements
of delegates to the Constitutional Convention." On the floor of the
Convention on July 17, 1787, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania opposed
a proposal to empower the national legislature to set aside state laws that
contradicted the proposed Constitution.7 2 "A law that ought to be
negatived," he said, "will be set aside in the judiciary department, and if that
security should fail, may be repealed by a national law."7 ' Luther Martin of
Maryland opposed creating a Council of Revision comprised of the
President and several judges." Contending that the constitutional veto of
the judges would be sufficient without also giving them a veto over
legislation in general, he explained: "[T]he Constitutionality of laws ... will
come before the Judges in their proper official character. In this character
they have a negative on the laws. Join them with the Executive in the
Revision and they will have a double negative."7
George Mason of Virginia also agreed that the judges could find laws
unconstitutional, but wanted them also to judge the policy of a law by
68. Id.
69. Id. Chief Justice John Marshall's subsequent rationale for judicial review parallels
Hamilton's reasoning. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-78 (1803). Prior
to the definite exposition in Marbury, the Supreme Court, driven by litigants raising
constitutional questions, was edging close to the mode of decision that Madison had
anticipated. See, e.g., Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 19 (1800) (Chase, J.)
(acknowledging that lawyers practicing before the Court concede that the Supreme Court
can declare an act of Congress to be unconstitutional, but that as of yet "there is no
adjudication of the Supreme Court itself upon the point").
70. Corwin, supra note 52, at 561.
71. See generally RECORDS,supra note 18.
72. 2 REcoRDs, supra note 18, at 28 (punctuation, capitalization, and abbreviations
altered to assist comprehension).

73. Id.
74. Id. at 76.

75. Id.
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participation in the Council of Revision. 6 As he explained to the
Convention delegates:
It had been said (by Mr. L. Martin) that if the Judges were joined
in this check on the laws, they would have a double negative,
since in their expository capacity of Judges they would have one
negative. He would reply that in this capacity they could impede
in one case only, the operation of laws. They could declare an
unconstitutional law void."
Acting in their "expository capacity," judges could declare legislation
unconstitutional. But if laws "unjust, oppressive, or pernicious" did not
violate the Constitution, "they would be under the necessity as Judges to
give it a free course."" Mason wanted judges to participate in a Council of
Revision to "prevent[] every improper law."" Rufus King of Massachusetts
agreed with Luther Martin: "[Tihe Judicial ought not to join in the negative
of a Law, because the Judges will have the expounding of those Laws when
they come before them; and they will no doubt stop the operation of such as
shall appear repugnant to the constitution.""o Elbridge Gerry, also of
Massachusetts, seconded his colleague's opinion.
Mr. Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a part of
it, as they will have a sufficient check against encroachments on
their own department by their exposition of the laws, which
involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality. In some
States the Judges had [actually] set aside laws as being against the
Constitution. This was done too with general approbation."
3. The Ratifying Conventions
Delegates to the ratifying conventions made similar statements
supporting judicial review.82 Patrick Henry, Governor of Virginia,
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 78.
Id.
Id.
Id.

80. 1 RECORDS, supra note 18, at 109.

81. Id. at 97.
82. Madison considered the ratification debates the best source, apart from the text, for
understanding the meaning of the Constitution.
[T]he legitimate meaning of the instrument must be derived from the text itself;
or if a key is to be sought elsewhere, it must be not in the opinions or intentions
of the body which planned and proposed the Constitution, but in the sense
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ultimately voted against ratification. Yet he stated: "I take it as the highest
encomium on this country, that the acts of the legislature, if
unconstitutional, are liable to be opposed by the judiciary."" He further
added, expressing his concern that state judges might fall under federal
domination: "The judiciary are the sole protection against a tyrannical
execution of the laws."" John Marshall, a delegate to the Virginia
convention, posed the question whether Congress could exceed its
delegated powers." He responded to his fellow delegates as he did fifteen
years later in Marbury v. Madison: "If they were to make a law not
warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the
judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard. They
would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They
would declare it void."" He further stated: "To what quarter will you look
for protection from an infringement on the Constitution, if you will not
give the power to the judiciary? There is no other body that can afford such
a protection."" William R. Davie, a delegate to the Philadelphia
Convention, brought the same message home to North Carolina. Without
judicial enforcement, he said, the Constitution would be a "dead letter.""
Therefore, "the judiciary ought to be competent to the decision of any
question arising out of the Constitution itself.""
Commenting on proposed language eventually embodied in the Tenth
Amendment,o Samuel Adams, delegate to the Massachusetts ratifying
convention, stated: "[I]f any law made by the federal government shall be
extended beyond the power granted by the proposed Constitution ... it will
be an error, and adjudged by the courts of law to be void."" Oliver
attached to it by the people in their respective State Conventions where it
received all the Authority which it possesses.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), WRITINGs, supra note 19, at
72.
83. 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 325 (2d ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
84. Id. at 539.
85. Id. at 553.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 554.
88. 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES 157.
89. Id. at 156.
90. "'[All powers not expressly delegated to Congress are reserved to the several states,
to be by them exercised.'" 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES 131. The Tenth Amendment states: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
91. 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES 131.
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Ellsworth, an active participant in the Philadelphia Convention,92 stated in
the Connecticut debates that the judiciary would protect the Constitution
from both federal and state usurpation:
This Constitution defines the extent of the powers of the general
government. If the general legislature should at any time
overleap their limits, the judicial department is a constitutional
check. If the United States go beyond their powers, if they make a
law which the Constitution does not authorize, it is void; and the
judicial power, the national judges, who, to secure their
impartiality, are to be made independent, will declare it to be
void. On the other hand, if the states go beyond their limits, if
they make a law which is a usurpation upon the general
government, the law is void; and upright, independent judges
will declare it to be so."
James Wilson, a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention and later an
associate justice of the Supreme Court, spoke these words during the
Pennsylvania debates: "If a law should be made inconsistent with those
powers vested by this instrument in Congress, the judges, as a consequence
of their independence ... will declare such law to be null and void; for the
power of the Constitution predominates.""
III. THE EFFECT OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention presumed that the Supreme
Court would review the actions of Congress for constitutionality." The
Constitution itself requires state court enforcement. The "all cases" clause
brings these decisions to the Supreme Court for review. The fear among
anti-Federalists that judicial review would mean judicial despotism is
further proof of the existence of the power.96 But what about the effect of

92.

WILLIAM GARROTT BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH 116-176 (MacMillan &

Co. 1905). Ellsworth is credited with the origin of the term "United States." Id. at 128.
93. 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES 196.
94. Id. at 489. See also 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 743 (Kermit L. Hall &

Mark David Hall eds., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2007) (arguing that judicial review is "a noble guard
against legislative despotism").
95. See supra text accompanying notes 59-81.
96. "This power in the judicial will enable them to mold the government into almost any
shape they please." Brutus Essay XI (January 31, 1788), in THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION:
FOR AND AGAINST 63 (J.R. Pole ed., 1987).
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the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Court has employed extensively to
extend its constitutional mandate over the states?
A. OverturningBarron v. Baltimore
Prior to the Civil War and the resulting constitutional amendments
enlarging federal jurisdiction over the states," the Supreme Court held that
the Bill of Rights did not limit state action." "These amendments," stated
Chief Justice Marshall, "demanded security against the apprehended
encroachments of the general government-not against those of the local
governments."99 Noting that the Constitution provided for specific
restraints on state legislation in Article I, Section 10, Marshall found no
parallel provision restraining the States from violation of the first eight
amendments: "[I]f in every inhibition intended to act on state power, words
are employed which directly express that intent; some strong reason must
be assigned for departing from this safe and judicious course in framing the
amendments, before that departure can be assumed."' 0 Finding no such
express application of the federal amendments to the states, Marshall
declined to imply one: "These amendments contain no expression
indicating an intention to apply them to the state governments. This court
cannot so apply them."'0 '
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Congressional Joint Committee on
Reconstruction drafted the Fourteenth Amendment,102 in part to remedy
this defect.' Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan drafted the first sentence
of Section I of the Amendment,' 4 and Rep. John Bingham of Ohio the
second.' Introducing the amendment on the floor of the Senate, Howard
97. See e.g., U.S. CONsT. amends. XIII, XIV, & XV.
98. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
99. Id. at 250.
100. Id. at 249.
101. Id. at 250.
102. "The legislative origin of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment seems to
have been in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction." Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
92 app. (1947) (Black., J., dissenting).
103. See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., IST SESs. 2764-66 (1866) (statement of Sen. Jacob
Howard on purpose of amendment).
104. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. For Howard's authorship, see CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS.
2890 (1866) ("This amendment which I have offered.. . .").
105. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
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explained that the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States"
referenced in the amendment included "the personal rights guarantied and
secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution[.]"o 6 He then
described in particular the content of these amendments-from the First
Amendment right of "freedom of speech and of the press" through the
Eighth Amendment right "to be secure against excessive bail and against
cruel and unusual punishments."' 7 Referring generally, but not by name, to
Barron v. Baltimore,'" Howard explained that "the course of decision of our
courts and the present settled doctrine is, that all these immunities,
privileges, rights, thus guarantied by the Constitution or recognized by it,
are secured to the citizen solely as a citizen of the United States and as a
party in their courts."' They did not operate "in the slightest degree as a
restraint or prohibition upon State legislation. States are not affected by
them. .. ."n0 Referring to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the
exact provision at issue in Barron,"' Howard noted that "it has been
repeatedly held that the restriction contained in the Constitution against the
taking of private property for public use without just compensation is not a
restriction upon State legislation, but applies only to the legislation of
Congress."l 2
Having identified the problem-finding a means to enforce the first eight
amendments against the States, a power then denied to the national
government"'-Howard explained that "[t]he great object of the first
section of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the power of the States

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. For
Bingham's authorship, see CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., SPEC. SESS. App. 84 (1871) ("I did
imitate the framers of the original Constitution.").
106. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., IST SEss. 2765 (1866).
107. Id.
108. 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
109. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2765 (1866).
110. Id.
111. "The plaintiff in error contends, that it comes within that clause in the fifth
amendment to the constitution, which inhibits the taking of private property for public use,
without just compensation." Barron, 32 U.S. at 247.
112. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1STSEss. 2765 (1866).
113. "Now, sir, there is no power given in the Constitution to enforce and to carry out
any of these guarantees. . . . the states are not restrained from violating the principles
embraced in them except by their own local constitutions, which may be altered from year to
year." Id. at 2765-66.
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and compel them at all times to respect these great fundamental
guarantees.""'
Arguing in the House on behalf of his original version of the
amendment,"' Representative Bingham also raised the problem of Barron v.
Baltimore:
A gentleman on the other side interrupted me and wanted to
know if I could cite a decision showing that the power of the
Federal Government to enforce in the United States courts the
bill of rights under the articles of amendment to the Constitution
had been denied. I answered that I was prepared to introduce
such decisions; and that is exactly what makes plain the necessity
of adopting this amendment." 6
Bingham then cited Barron v. Baltimore for the proposition that "the
existing amendments are not applicable to and do not bind the states.""'
Five years later during House debate, Bingham recalled how Marshall's
citation to the "No state shall" phraseology in Article I, § 10 of the
Constitution had inspired him to recast the amendment into its final
form." 8
In reexamining that case of Barron, . . . I noted and apprehended

as I never did before, certain words in that opinion of Marshall.
Referring to the first eight articles of amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, the Chief Justice said: "Had the
framers of these amendments intended them to be limitations on
the powers of the State governments they would have imitated
the framers of the original Constitution, and have expressed that
intention."
Acting upon this suggestion I did imitate the framers of the
original Constitution. As they had said "no State shall emit bills
of credit, pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligations of contracts;" imitating their example
and imitating it to the letter, I prepared the provision of the first
114. Id. at 2766.
115. "The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life,
liberty, and property." Id. at 1088.
116. Id. at 1089.
117. Id. at 1089-90.
118. CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., SPEC. SESS. App. 84 (1871) (citation omitted).
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section of the fourteenth amendment as it stands in the
Constitution ..

"9

Bingham also explained that the privileges and immunities of the
Fourteenth Amendment "are chiefly defined in the first eight amendments
to the Constitution of the United States."1 2 0
The construction placed on the Fourteenth Amendment by Bingham and
Howard, its authors and advocates, carries significant weight in construing
Congress's intent in approving it for consideration by the states. Justice
Hugo Black, a member of the Senate from 1927 to 1937, explained:
I know from my years in the United States Senate that it is to
men like Congressman Bingham, who steered the Amendment
through the House, and Senator Howard, who introduced it in
the Senate, that members of Congress look when they seek the
real meaning of what is being offered. And they vote for or
against a bill based on what the sponsors of that bill and those
who oppose it tell them it means.121
Bingham and Howard recommended enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment to overturn Barron v. Baltimore, and thereby through the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, convey authority to the national
government to apply the Bill of Rights against the states.122 Bingham
understood the use of this phrase in the amendment to carry a broader
meaning than in Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution where it signified only
that "the State could not refuse to extend to citizens of other States the same
general rights secured to its own." 23 He explained the distinction:
Is it not clear that other and different privileges and immunities
than those to which a citizen of a State was entitled are secured
119. Id. (citation omitted).
120. Id.
121. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 165 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). For a similar
approach to legislative intent, see Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court
Jurisdiction:A Guided Questfor the Original Understandingof Article III, 132 U. PA. L.REv.
741, 746 n. 11 (1984) (placing "primary reliance on the actions and statements of most vocal
and active proponents or drafters of the document, on the assumption that the views would
have been openly challenged or corrected if out of step with the remainder of the supporters
of the document").
122. Congressman Wilson recognized Bingham's intent, referring to "the bill of rights
which the gentleman desires to have enforced by an amendment to the Constitution." CONG.
GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1294 (1866).
123. CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., SPEC. SEss. App. 84 (1871).
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by the provision of the fourteenth article, that no State shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, which are defined in the eight articles of amendment, and
which were not limitations on the power of the States before the
fourteenth amendment made them limitations?124
B. CongressionalEnforcement of the FourteenthAmendment
Bingham and Howard had more in mind than simply enshrining a
"glittering generality" in the Constitution.'25 They wanted to enact an
enforcement mechanism to overcome southern recalcitrance. Unless the
proposed amendment compelled observance of the Bill of Rights in the
former confederacy, "the loyal minority of white citizens and the
disfranchised colored citizens will be utterly powerless" against a vengeful
"majority of rebels.""' Once the federal armies withdrew, only the "force of
national laws" could restrain a swift return to oppression.'27 Bingham feared
a potential reign of terror against loyalists and emancipated blacks: "Where
is the power in Congress, unless this or some similar amendment be
adopted, to prevent the reenactment of those infernal statutes of
banishment and confiscation and imprisonment and murder under which
people have suffered in those States during the last four years?"'28
The Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing slavery, granted Congress an
indispensable enforcement power.'29 Bingham declared:
Let any State try the experiment of again enslaving men, and we
will see, whether it is not competent for the Congress of the
United States to make it a felony punishable by death to reduce
any man, white or black, under color of State law, to a system of
enforced human servitude or slavery
.130
Without a similar provision the proposed amendment would be a dead
letter. "Is the bill of rights to stand in our Constitution hereafter, as in the
past five years within eleven States, a mere dead letter? It is absolutely

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
CONST.
130.

Id.
Id. at 83.
CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SEss. 1094 (1866).
Id. at 1093-94.
Id. at 1093.
"Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S.
amend. XIII, § 2.
CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., SPEC. SEss. App. 85 (1871).
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essential to the safety of the people that it should be enforced."l 3 ' Section 5
of the new amendment supplied the necessary power.1 32 Bingham
continued:
The proposition pending before the House is simply a
proposition to arm the Congress of the United States, by the
consent of the people of the United States, with the power to
enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the constitution today. It
"hath that extent-no more.""'
The amendment, according to Bingham, had a dual impact: imposing
new limitations upon the states and granting new powers to Congress,
neither of which had existed before.'34 "Gentlemen who oppose this
amendment," he concluded, "oppose the grant of power to enforce the bill
of rights.""'
In the Senate, Jacob Howard explained the interlocking relationship
between the prohibitions of Section 1 and the enforcement power of Section
5:
[S]ection one is a restriction upon the States, and does not, of
itself, confer any power upon Congress. The power which
Congress has, under this amendment, is derived, not from that
section, but from the fifth section, which gives it authority to
pass laws which are appropriate to the attainment of the great
object of the amendment. I look upon the first section, taken in
connection with the fifth, as very important.' 6
C. The FourteenthAmendment as a Mandatefor CongressionalPolicy
Making
The Fourteenth Amendment, according to its sponsors, extended the Bill
of Rights to the states through the Privileges or Immunities Clause,"' and
131.

CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1090 (1866).

132. "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
133. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1088 (1866).
134. CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., SPEC. SESS. App. 85 (1871).
135. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1090 (1866).
136. Id. at 2766 (1866). Another Senator posed the question whether the Bill of Rights

was more than "a mere declaration of rights, carrying with it no power of enforcement."
CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., 1ST SESS. 476 (1871) (Senator Dawes).
137. For agreement with this position, see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-123
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3058-88 (2010)
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empowered Congress to enforce these rights by appropriate legislation.
Until Congress acts, however, the courts arguably have no independent
authority to enforce the substantive provisions." Senator Oliver Morton, a
contemporary, explained that "the remedy for the violation of the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments was expressly not left to the courts.
The remedy was legislative, because in each the amendment itself provided
that it shall be enforced by legislation on the part of Congress." 3 9 Ten years
after ratification, the Supreme Court stated:
It is not said the judicialpower of the general government shall
extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting the rights
and immunities guaranteed. It is not said that branch of the
government shall be authorized to declare void any action of a
State in violation of the prohibitions. It is the power of Congress
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (Second Amendment). A
long scholarly article refuted Justice Black's argument that the Framers intended the
Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the Bill of Rights. See Charles Fairman, Does the
FourteenthAmendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding,2 STAN. L.
REv. 5 (1949). "In his contention that Section I was intended and understood to impose
Amendments I to VIII upon the states, the record of history is overwhelmingly against him."
Id. at 139. Fairman, in turn, met his own discreditor. William W. Crosskey, Charles Fairman,
"Legislative History," and The Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1 (1954). Subsequent scholarship tends to confirm Crosskey, and thus reestablish
Black's credibility. See Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1197 (1995); Alfred Avins, Incorporation of
the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1968)
("[F]ramers of the Fourteenth Amendment deemed the various provisions of the first eight
amendments to the United States Constitution to be among the privileges and immunities of
United States citizenship which no state could abridge."); Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, PartII: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 99 Geo. L. J. 329, 432 (2011) ("Bingham crafted the Privileges or Immunities
Clause in order to protect the personal rights expressly listed in the Constitution, in
particular the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights."); see generally Michael Kent
Curtis, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS

(1986).
138. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses are also subject to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
139. CONG. GLOBE, 42D CONG., 2D SESS. 525 (1872). See Laurent B. Frantz, Congressional

Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353, 1356
(1964) ("[Tlhe framers and backers of the fourteenth amendment were primarily interested
in enlarging the powers of Congress, not those of the federal judiciary, which was looked
upon with considerable distrust."), cited in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 n.7
(1966) (stating that historical evidence suggests that "the sponsors and supporters of the
Amendment were primarily interested in augmenting the power of Congress, rather than the
judiciary").
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which has been enlarged[.] Congress is authorized to enforce the
prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some legislation is
contemplated to make the amendments fully effective.o
Although the Founders expected the Supreme Court to review
congressional acts for constitutionality and to hear appeals of federal
questions from state courts,141 the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
provided for congressional, not judicial, enforcement of the Reconstruction
amendments.
The Court's modern employment of the Fourteenth Amendment as a
license to engage in enforcement of constitutional rights collides with this
express allocation of power. As Justice Black observed: "[T]he people, in § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, designated the governmental tribunal they
wanted to provide additional rules to enforce the guarantees of that
Amendment. The branch of Government they chose was not the Judicial
Branch but the Legislative."l42
One may safely assert that Congress, at a minimum, has coequal power
with the Supreme Court to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. A leading
scholar states: "Section Five was born of the conviction that Congress-no
less than the courts-has the duty and the authority to interpret the
Constitution."'4 3 Another scholar states: "Judicial enforcement against the
will of Congress would convert 'Congress shall' into 'the Court shall.' Such a
conversion would usurp power withheld."'" Yet the Court in a 1997 case
scolded Congress for acting under Section 5 to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment more strictly than the Court would desire."' Liberal scholars,
140. ExParte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879).
141. See supra § II.B.
142. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663, 678-79 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
143. Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Comment: Institutions
and Interpretation:A Critiqueof City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L.REV. 153,183 (1997).
144. Raoul Berger, CongressionalContraction of FederalJurisdiction, 1980 Wis. L. REv.
801, 807 (1980).
145. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) ("[Tlhe Court will treat its
precedents with the respect due them . . . and contrary expectations must be
disappointed.... [T]his Court's precedent . . . must control."). See also id. at 545-46
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen it enacts legislation in furtherance of its delegated
powers, Congress must make its judgments consistent with this Court's exposition of the
Constitution."). Leading scholars were appalled at the Court's assumption of an exclusive
prerogative to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment. See Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs
in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 743, 765, 792 (1998) ("Congress did not
entrust the fruits of the Civil War to the unchecked discretion of the Court that decided Dred
Scott v. Sandford .... [yet] [tihe Court now asserts unchecked power to shrink the
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unhappy with the federalism opinions of the Rehnquist court striking down
favored social legislation, have also taken up the Section 5 cause."*
IV. THE SUPREME LEGISLATURE
Legislatures look forward; courts look backward. The legislature sets
policy to govern future behavior; courts determine whether that policy has
been obeyed. Today, however, the Supreme Court functions as the final
policymaker in the American system of government, requiring its rules of
decision to have prospective and plenary effect."' Waving its constitutional
wand, the High Court wields veto authority over all legislative bodies on
matters that a litigant might plausibly construe to implicate the
Constitution. By reliance on elastic provisions like the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses,' and the attribution of unenumerated rights, the
Court has transformed the Constitution into an undifferentiated lump of
clay, whose plasticity it may mold into any form desired.
The Framers did not intend that courts would displace ordinary
legislative policymaking. The Constitutional Convention, in fact, rejected a
Fourteenth Amendment to as small a scope as it chooses."); McConnell, supra note 143, at
182 ("It is doubtful that the Republicans who drafted and adopted the Amendment would be
greatly impressed with the 'primary authority' of the institution that had so recently
produced Dred Scott."). A contemporary newspaper stated: "The Reconstruction Acts are full
of the rights and liberties of millions of men; and to have these stricken down, by the
decision of some old fossil on the Supreme Bench whose political opinion belongs to a past
era, would be an outrage on humanity." INDIANAPOLIS JOURNAL, Jan. 25, 1868, quoted in
WARREN, supra note 1, at 190.
146. See generallyRuth Colker, The Supreme Court's HistoricalErrors in City of Boerne v.
Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV. 783 (2002); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100
MICH. L. REv. 80 (2001). For a broader view of the consistency of the Court, liberal or
conservative, in asserting judicial supremacy see Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than
Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102
COLUM. L.REv. 237 (2002). John Bingham criticized the Court for daring to descend "to the
settlement of political questions which it has no more right to decide for the American
people than has the Court of St. Petersburg." CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 483 (1868).

147. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
NationalPolicy-Maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 563, 565 (2001) (reprinted from 6 J.PUB L. 279 (1957))
(finding that the Supreme Court is a policymaking political institution, compelled into that
role by the vagueness of the Constitution, or propelled by the Justices' personal policy
preferences); Richard Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Foreword:A PoliticalCourt,
119 HARv. L. REv. 32, 40 (2005) ("[T]he Supreme Court, when it is deciding constitutional
cases, is political in the sense of having and exercising discretionary power as capacious as a
legislature's.").
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Council of Revision that would have allowed the Supreme Court justices to
overrule the legislature on policy grounds. No matter how bad a law
appeared, they had no power to disturb it unless the Constitution itself was
offended."' When the Supreme Court attempted to act as national
policymaker in the Dred Scott case,'s the first time it overturned a federal
law since Marbury v. Madison,'' Abraham Lincoln strenuously objected:
[I]f the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting
the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the
Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation
between parties in personal actions the people will have ceased to
be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned
their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.15 2
Although the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been very questionable
textually, the Framers of the amendment anticipated a similar result via the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.5 5 Thus, this tortured construction of the
Due Process Clause does not necessarily work a great substantive evil. By
employing that same clause, however, to constitutionalize "unenumerated"
rights not specified in the Bill of Rights, the Court soars on a magic carpet
ride into purely legislative realms. The embedding of the sexual revolution
in the Constitution is the most egregious example.'5 ' The Court has
imposed a regime of sexual license on the country without any textual basis
in the Constitution, creating rights of privacy and sexual autonomy
nowhere mentioned in the document. Scholars on both ends of the cultural
spectrum acknowledge the flimsy foundation for these opinions.'5 ' No
consensus has emerged on a suitable remedy, in part because those pleased
149. See supra text accompanying notes 72-81.
150. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
151. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
152. Abraham Lincoln, Inaugural Address (March 4, 1861).
153. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra notes 102-24 and accompanying text. See
also McConnell, supra note 143, at 170 ("It is [the Privileges or Immunities Clause] that
'incorporated' provisions of the Bill of Rights and made them applicable to the states-not,
as the Court has often stated, the Due Process Clause.").
154. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
155. For a liberal's revulsion at the absurdity of one opinion, see John Hart Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
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by the results have no incentive to temper the Court's excursion into
creative law making. Of course, this power is two-edged: conservative
majorities can also make law.16
A good example of values in action is Epperson v. Arkansas,"' a challenge
to the Arkansas law that forbade the teaching of evolution in public
schools.' Like the contraception cases, the Justices, bereft of Biblical
understanding, instinctively rejected a public policy that contradicted
Since the Constitution does not speak about
modern secularism.'
contraception, and the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to
promote sexual license, the Court invented a "right of privacy" to invalidate
laws outlawing contraception. Similarly, in Epperson, the Justices knew
what they wanted to do-strike the law. Finding a legal justification for the
result was the hard part.
Some of the Justices, searching for a rationale, suggested a generic
"vagueness" invalidation: "I would rest on the vagueness of this law as the
safest basis," said Chief Justice Warren.16 o Justice White, though uncertain
of the rationale, agreed on the result. "I could go on vagueness if someone
can articulate it, as I have not been able to .... I reverse doubtfully on
vagueness."' 6' Justice Fortas, however, wishing a bolder attack, argued for
striking the law as an establishment of religion.162 His view prevailed. Justice
Stewart, concurring, argued that the teacher had a First Amendment right
to discuss evolution-a theory that would divest school boards of

156. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
157. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
158. Id. at 98.
159. Justice Fortas, for the majority, commented on "the discomfort which the statute's
quixotic prohibition necessarily engenders in the modern mind." Id. at 102. He suggested
that those who favored the law were snobs who considered human beings superior to
monkeys, and did not wish to be associated with their simian ancestors. Id. at 102 n.10
(quoting R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE
UNITED STATES 324 (1955)). He used the uncomplimentary term "fundamentalist" three
times. Id. at 98 ("the upsurge of 'fundamentalist' religious fervor"); id. ("fundamentalist
sectarian conviction"); id. at 102 n.9 ("fundamentalist theory").
160. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONs BEHIND
NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONs 406 (Del Dickson ed., 2001).
161. Id. at 408. One scholar comments: "White had no interest in theory. He believed in
'good' outcomes, and that was sufficient. His vote in constitutional cases never varied from
his views on the merits of the underlying policy. What was good was constitutional; what
was bad was not." LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 210
(2000).
162. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 160, at 408.
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curriculum control.'6 Justice Black, concurring on vagueness grounds,
questioned whether a law that had never been enforced in its forty years of
existence, presented a justiciable controversy.'" He also objected to the
Establishment Clause rationale, arguing that removing a divisive issue from
the curriculum was a state prerogative and that forcing the teaching of
evolution reflected hostility towards religion.6 s
A secularist," Justice Fortas disliked the "monkey law."' 67 When his
clerk argued that the statute was not being enforced, he responded, "Maybe
you're right-but I'd rather see us knock this out."'"6 "Justice Fortas had
always admired John Scopes," wrote legal historian Peter Irons, "and felt
that striking down the Arkansas law would also erase the blot on
Tennessee's history."' 9 "As a Justice," his biographer relates, "he was a legal
strategist .

. .

. As always, what mattered to him were results. Despite his

attempt to present himself as 'a man of law,' Fortas rarely believed that [the]
law commanded him to act against his own wishes."'o According to John
Griffiths, one of Fortas' first clerks, he viewed legal analysis as "a necessary
form of packaging that had to be provided for things he wanted to do."' 7 '
After revising one memorandum, Fortas returned it to Griffiths with the
brief order: "Decorate it."172 Griffith adorned the draft with the requisite
legal citations." Fortas' biographer concluded that Fortas "reached
decisions first and rationalized them later."' 7
Utilizing the law as a tool of social policy, Justice Fortas almost retained a
majority for the proposition that criminalizing a chronic alcoholic for

163.
164.
165.
166.

Epperson, 393 U.S. at 115-16 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result).
Id. at 109, 112 (Black, J., concurring).
Id. at 112-13.
"He had championed a secular, national culture all his life." LAURA KALMAN, ABE
FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 275 (1990).
167. Fortas used the term "monkey law" three times in the opinion. See Epperson, 393
U.S. at 98, 101, 108.
168. KALMAN, supra note 166, at 274.
169. Id. (quoting PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 214 (1988)).
170. KALMAN, supra note 166, at 276.
171. Id. at 271.
172. Id. at 271-72.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 272. See also Mark Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Biographies,70 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 730, 754-55 (1995) [hereinafter Tushnet, Themes] (noting "Fortas's fluidity; if one
doctrinal approach did not attract enough support, another one might. Only the outcome
mattered; the law did not.").
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public drunkenness violated the Eighth Amendment."' Regardless of one's
view of Fortas' sympathy for the habitual inebriate, the idea that the
Framers of the Eighth Amendment in 1791, or the Fourteenth Amendment
in 1868, envisioned extending constitutional protection to the town drunk
in the public exhibition of his condition is beyond the understanding of any
man, drunk or sober. But, as explained above, neither Fortas, nor most of
his other liberal colleagues on the Warren Court, had any regard for the
intent of the drafters of the instrument they swore to support.176 Being a
Supreme Court Justice was a free ticket to a policy-making playground, a
license to legislate one's vision of justice into law.
Not only are the outcomes legislative, but often so is the process. Political
scientists and legal scholars have limned in detail the protracted internal
bargaining that lies behind many key judicial opinions-a process of give7
and-take, indistinguishable from the essence of the legislative process."' A
175. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 554-55 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting). Fortas had five
votes for his revolutionary proposition when Justice White defected. KALMAN, supra note
166, at 257-59. "'Powell v. Texas is the one thing I can remember that he really cared about,'"
one clerk recalled. Id. at 257. See also Budd v. California, 385 U.S. 909, 913 (1966) (Fortas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("The use of the crude and formidable weapon of
criminal punishment of the alcoholic is neither seemly nor sensible, neither purposeful nor
civilized.").
176. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 3 (All judicial officers "shall be bound by Oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . . .").
177. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Piercingthe Veil: William J. Brennan's Account
of Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 341 (2001) (offering an
inside view of court decision-making from a Brennan memoir that reveals intense
bargaining over words and phrases) [hereinafter Epstein & Knight, Piercing the Veil]; LEE
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (portraying the Court as an
intense bargaining arena where Justices negotiate to maximize policy preferences); Samuel
A. Alito, Jr., Note, The Released Time Cases Revisited: A Study of Group Decisionmaking by
the Supreme Court, 83 YALE L.J. 1202 (1974) (offering one of the first detailed studies of
internal bargaining on the Court, and demonstrating that the opinion of the Court, like a
legislative compromise, may reflect the outcome of the negotiation process). See id. at 1235
("[T]he written opinion may not represent the position of any of the Justices who signed
it."); FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE
SUPREME COURT (2000) (analyzing the politics of coalition formation on the Court); WALTER
F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964) (presenting the first comprehensive
study of the Court as a political institution); BERNARD SCHwARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED
OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT (1985) (collecting early opinion drafts indicating that legal
rationales are a malleable means to policy ends); Alexander M . Bickel & Harry H.
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 3 (1957) (criticizing tendency of Court to adjudicate by assertion rather than reason
and to produce unanimous opinions in politically controversial cases that display the
"vacuity characteristic of desperately negotiated documents"); Howard E. Dean, Judicial
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Supreme Court opinion, like the Constitution itself, may reflect bargaining
between competing factions."' Some Justices concede that their views are
political, deriving more from a personal conception of justice than from the
text of the Constitution, which they deride as vague or outdated.' 9 An
intriguing example of the legislative process at work on the Court is the
unrestrained acceptance of amicus briefs from all quarters, many frankly no
more than elaborate policy arguments laced with extra-record factual
assertions.
A. JudicialLobbying through Amicus Briefs
Prior to the era of Supreme Court policymaking, amicus curiae briefs
offered a neutral analysis of significant points of law that the parties may
have overlooked or inadequately addressed.'"
The amicus was truly a
friend of the court, not a supplementary advocate for a party. Often the
Court invited the brief.'"' As the Supreme Court assumed the role of
national policymaker, however, the amicus brief became a tactical interestgroup weapon to drive the court to a desired outcome.'82 Rather than
offering unbiased and judicious analysis aimed at easing the Court's

Review, Judicial Legislation, and Judicial Oligarchy, 34 OR. L. REV. 20 (1954) (reviewing
criticism of the Court as a legislature); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Supreme Court as a
Legislature,64 CORNELL L. REV. (1978) (arguing that the Court performs legislative functions
and endorsing the practice); Richard L. Hasen, Rules, Politics, and Policy: The Untold
Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo, 2 ELECTION L.J. (2004) (using the Brennan, Marshall,
and Powell papers to provide an inside look at creation of a court opinion).
178. "The justices bargain and compromise, they think prospectively, and they use
whatever information they have to persuade others of the rightness of their views." Epstein &
Knight, Piercing the Veil, supra note 177, at 371.
179. See infra, § IV(B).
180. Samuel Krislov, The Amicus CuriaeBrief From Friendshipto Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J.
694, 694 (1963) ('A friend of the court. A term applied to a bystander, who without having
an interest in the cause, of his own knowledge makes suggestion on a point of law or of fact
for the information of the presiding judge.") (quoting ABBOTT'S DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND
PHRASES USED IN AM. OR ENG.

JuRis.

62 (1879)).

181. Linda Sandstrom Simard, An EmpiricalStudy of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A
Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REv. LITIG. 669, 687 (2008)
("[W]hen judges perceive a need for additional information they will occasionally request
amicus participation.").
182. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs
on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 743, 752-53 (2000) (Amicus submissions increased
from 531 in the 1946-1955 decade to 4907 in the 1986-1995 decade; cases with amicus briefs
filed increased from 23% to 85% in the same period.).
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analytical task, amicus briefs today are frankly partisan.' Judge Richard
Posner observes: "In my experience in two decades as an appellate judge ...
it is very rare for an amicus curiae brief to do more than repeat in somewhat
different language the arguments in the brief of the party whom the amicus
is supporting."'" Consequently, the briefs are frequently of no practical
help, except to provide firepower for positions already staked out by
opposing Court factions. The value of an array of interest-group briefs is
questionable. "Courts value submissions not to see how the interest groups
line up, but to learn about facts and legal perspectives that the litigants have
not adequately developed."' 5 Judge Posner remonstrates:
The vast majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies of
litigants and duplicate the arguments made in the litigants'
briefs, in effect merely extending the length of the litigant's brief.
Such amicus briefs should not be allowed. They are an abuse.
The term "amicus curiae" means friend of the court, not friend of
a party. 86
In high-profile cases, the amicus submissions dwarf the parties' briefs."'
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act' cases, for example,

183. "The amicus is no longer a neutral, amorphous embodiment of justice, but an active
participant in the interest group struggle." Krislov, supra note 180, at 703. "The increased use
of amicus briefs today has taken on the appearance of group combat." JOSEPH F. MENEZ,
DECISION MAKING IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 111 (1984).
184. Voices for Choices v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 545 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner,
C.J., in chambers).
185. Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 358 F.3d 516,518 (7th Cir. 2004).
186. Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Posner, C.J., in chambers). See also Philip B. Kurland & Dennis J. Hutchinson, With Friends
Like These. . . , A.B.A. J., Aug. 1984, at 16 (noting that amicus briefs, more often than not,
"are expressions of votes rather than reasons").
187. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010) (Second Amendment) (56 amici
briefs); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (abortion) (30 amici briefs); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (detainee habeas) (52 amici briefs); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (affirmative action) (94 amici briefs); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
(sodomy) (33 amici briefs); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (right-to-die) (63
amici briefs); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (abortion) (29
amici briefs); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (abortion) (79 amici
briefs); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (affirmative action) (84
amici briefs). For docket sheets listing filings of the current and previous term, see Docket,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docket.aspx
(last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
188. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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attracted a record 136 amici." The competing fusillades of amicus briefs
parallel the lineup of interest groups at a Congressional hearing, who
present testimony, oral and written, for and against proposed legislation.'90
Indeed, commentators routinely characterize the competitive employment
of amicus briefs to sway the court as "judicial lobbying."' The Court freely
accepts these widely diverse submissions 9 2 that have not passed through the
rigor of the adversarial process, 9 3 acting more as a legislative body
responsive to organized interest-group pressure than as a judicial forum for
the resolution of disputes between particular litigants.' The willing
189. See Terry Baynes, "Friends" Line Up for Obamacare Supreme Court Challenge,
Mar. 18, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/18/us-usaNEWS,
supremecourt-friends-idUSBRE82HO9F20120318.
190. "Political scientists have long perceived an analogy between interest groups lobbying
legislatures and interest groups seeking to influence judicial decisions through the filing of
amicus briefs." Kearney & Merrill, supra note 182, at 783. Amicus briefs provide "the judicial
counterpart of lobbying and congressional hearings in the legislative process." Krislov, supra
note 180, at 717.
191. Frederick B. Wiener, The Supreme Court'sNew Rules, 68 HARV. L. REv. 20, 80 (1954)
(noting that an amicus brief is "essentially an instrumentality designed to exert extrajudicial
pressure on judicial decisions"). See also Andrew P. Morriss, Private Amici Curiae and the
Supreme Court's 1997-1998 Term Employment Law Jurisprudence,7 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
823, 829 (1999) ("[A]mici's view of their own efforts is akin to that of groups lobbying before
Congress."); Fowler V. Harper & Edwin D. Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 1172, 1172 (1953) ("The lobbying device available for use before the Court is the
brief amicus."); id. at 1173 (observing that lobbying groups treat the Court like a "politicallegislative body, amenable and responsive to mass pressures from any source").
192. "An amicus curiaebrief that brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not
already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help to the Court." Sup.
CT. R. 37(1).
193. Parties can also offend in this regard, arguing facts not of record in briefs to the
Court. Far from rejecting this "evidence," the Court has relied on it. See Sykes v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2274-75 (2011) (using statistical studies first appearing in the case in
the Government's brief to support its decision about the dangerousness of vehicle flight to
evade police). Justice Scalia complained of "untested judicial factfinding masquerading as
statutory interpretation."
Supreme Court briefs are an inappropriate place to develop the key facts in a
case. We normally give parties more robust protection, leaving important
factual questions to district courts and juries aided by expert witnesses and the
procedural protections of discovery. An adversarial process in the trial courts
can identify flaws in the methodology of the studies that the parties put
forward; here, we accept the studies' findings on faith, without examining their
methodology at all.
Id. at 2286 (citations omitted).
194. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1281 (1976) (noting the transformation of the federal judiciary from a body resolving
REUTERS
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admission of extra-record evidence'" and novel arguments'96 on appeal
leaves the judicial process-and the Rules of Evidence-in the dust, as the
Court sifts through piles of amicus briefs97 in search of helpful tidbits'9" or
conclusive evidence"' to craft its de novo resolution of the issues.2 00 Any
facts that an amicus brief might supply are suspect as advocacy

disputes between private litigants to a freewheeling crafter and administrator of public
policy).
195. See Simard, supra note 181, at 696-97 (noting that Justice Ginsburg found "extrarecord factual information" submitted by amici to be valuable in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003)).
196. The Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), overturning prior precedent, even though only an amicus brief urged that
result. Id. at 646 n.3. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court relied on the
Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause to impose custodial interrogation rules on the
states. None of the four consolidated cases under consideration led with the Fifth
Amendment argument. Two omitted it, and the other two relied primarily on the Sixth
Amendment holding from Escobedo v. Arizona, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). See Charles D.
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 109, 118 & n.45 (1998). The ACLU amicus
brief emphasized the Fifth Amendment, and provided excerpts from police manuals
demonstrating the routine employment of psychologically coercive interrogation. Id. The
Court "followed the basic approach" of the ACLU brief, Weisselberg, supra, at 119, quoting
extensively from the cited manuals. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-55. See also Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 n.* (1994) (noting that in the right circumstances "we will consider
arguments raised only in an amicus brief"); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989)
(plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (addressing retroactivity issue that had been raised only
in an amicus brief).
197. See Simard, supra note 181, at 688 (reporting that "[Ginsburg's] clerks often divide
the amicus briefs into three piles: those that should be skipped entirely, those that should be
skimmed, and those that should be read in full").
198. Justice Ginsburg noted that a "gem" could be missed in the sheer volume of the
briefs. Id. at 700.
199. See, e.g., Rick Perlstein, What Gay Studies Taught the Court, WASH. POST, July 13,
2003, at B3. The Court's overturning of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), relied significantly on historical analysis presented in
amicus briefs from pro-gay-rights history professors, the ACLU, and the Cato Institute. See
also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Yale Law School and the Overrulingof Bowers v. Hardwick, 51
YALE L. REP. 36 (Winter, 2004) (stating that the reasoning in Lawrence tracked amicus briefs
submitted by Yale Law School professors and graduates: "the overruling of Bowers v.
Hardwick was a Yale Law School seminar").
200. "Can social 'facts' which could never successfully be introduced at trial be freely
entered and accepted at the appellate stage? Is, in other words, litigation at the Supreme
Court level in fact sometimes a trial de novo?" Arthur Selwyn Miller & Jerome A. Barron,
The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A
PreliminaryInquiry,61 VA. L.REV. 1187, 1234 n.121 (1975).
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ammunition, untried by peer review or any independent confirmation.2"'
The sidestepping of the discipline and constraint of the adversarial
process 202 suggests that the Court enjoys its position atop the judicial
hierarchy as the legislature of last resort.2 03
The Court does not rely solely on amici to supply legislative facts.20
Justices assign their clerks to search for citable books and articles that
support their preferred outcomes. After the Court granted review of three
death penalty cases in June, 1971,205 Justice Douglas instructed his clerks:
"The question of the death penalty has been a hobby of mine for some
years. I have always thought it was extremely unwise as public policy to
enforce it." 20 6 To determine if the death penalty also violated the Eighth
Amendment, he asked his clerks to research "the sociological, penological,
psychiatric, and legislative aspects of this whole problem. 207 On a policymaking quest, he specifically instructed the clerks not to research judicial
opinions. "[J]udges," he explained, "are pretty ignorant people."20 8 His

201. "Amicus curiae briefs sometimes try to fill empirical gaps ... but these are advocacy
documents, not subject to peer review or other processes for verification." Richard A.
Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Foreword: A PoliticalCourt, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 32,
48 (2005).
202. As non-litigants, amici are not bound by standing requirements, joinder rules,
justiciability, subject matter jurisdiction, adversarial evidence testing, or preclusion rules that
prohibit bringing up the same issue time and again. Simard, supra note 181, at 674-75.
"[Wihen facts are freely found at the appellate level through an expansive use of judicial
notice, the lawsuit is in fact retried in the appellate court but without benefit of counsel."
Miller & Barron, supra note 200, at 1216.
203. Commenting on the receipt of "about 60 friend-of-the-court briefs from
organizations of doctors, psychologists, nurses, hospice workers and people with handicaps"
in the right-to-die case of Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), Justice Breyer
stated: "Such briefs play an important role in educating judges on potentially relevant
technical matters, helping to make us not experts but educated lay persons and thereby
helping to improve the quality of our decisions." JusticeBreyer Callsfor Experts to Aid Courts
in Complex Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1998, at A17.
204. A court that creates public policy "is acting legislatively . .. [and] the facts which
inform the tribunal's legislative judgment are called legislative facts." Kenneth Culp Davis,
Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 945, 952 (1955).

205. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
206. THE DOUGLAS LErERS 194-95 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1987).
207. Id.

208. Id. Appellate judges supposedly are bound by the facts in the trial record.
Legislators, of course, may seek understanding on a subject from any source. Douglas,
enjoying the euphoria of legislating, disparages his colleagues who act merely as adjudicators.
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subsequent concurrence read like a college term paper on the death
penalty.2 9
A decade earlier, Justice William Brennan, a Catholic, spent two and
one-half months researching and writing a seventy-page concurrence in the
school Bible-reading case21 oaimed at convincing the Catholic hierarchy that
his vote to abolish the practice was sound historically and as a matter of
law.21 ' Aiming at this curial audience, he neither invited nor accepted joins
from the other Justices. He wanted the concurrence to be purely his own
voice-a lone opinion aimed at a particular constituency.21 2 His biographer
relates: "He and his clerks worked seven days a week exhaustively
researching the issue. Brennan wrote out his opinion in longhand while his
clerks added footnotes gleaned from the shelves full of books and articles
they found inside the Court's library or borrowed from the Library of
Congress and universities."21 3 The result, laden with seventy-eight dense
multi-source footnotes discussing historical and social science research,
"read less like a court opinion than a historical study."214 Brennan
personally created his own extra-record amicus brief and inserted it into the
U.S. Reports.
By welcoming a torrent of amicus briefs and doing their own
independent factual research on policy questions,2 15 the Justices act not as a
209. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). At some point during his last
few years on the Court, Douglas wrote to Harvard seeking a graduate student in political
science as a clerk. Personal knowledge of author.
210. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230-304 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
211.

SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 172-73

(2010).
212. Id. at 173. "He made clear to his colleagues that he wished this to be his statement
alone. He would accept no offers to join the opinion." Id.
213. Id. at 172. His clerks were Richard A. Posner, later a Seventh Circuit judge, and
Robert O'Neil, later President of the University of the Virginia.
214. Id. at 173.
215. See James R. Acker, Social Science in Supreme Court Death Penalty Cases: Citation
Practices and Their Implications, 8 JUST. Q. 421 (1991) (noting widespread use of social
science research to support opinions, a practice analogous to legislative fact-finding). For
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Chief Justice Earl Warren did his own outside
research, contacting the publishers of police interrogation manuals cited in the ACLU
amicus brief for statistics on their distribution. Weisselberg, supra note 196, at 119 n.48
(citing letters in the Earl Warren Papers at the Library of Congress). See Miranda,384 U.S. at
449 n.9 ("All these texts have had rather extensive use among law enforcement agencies and
among students of police science, with total sales and circulation of over 44,000.").
Most recently, Justice Breyer not only had the Supreme Court librarians research a
case for him, but also boldly cited their research methodology and results in a separate
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court but as a legislature.2 16 Bypassing the adversarial process and the rules
of evidence,217 they graze at will in legislative pastures, ruminating
contentedly over their next venture in constitutional law-making.218

appendix! Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2771-79 (2011) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) ("With the assistance of the Supreme Court Library, I have compiled these two
appendixes listing peer-reviewed academic journal articles .... "). As the majority noted, "the
vast preponderance of this research is outside the record. . . ." Id. at 2739 n.8 (majority
opinion). Fifteen years earlier, Justice Breyer repeated the same feat, inserting into U.S.
Reports his own thirteen-page bibliography identifying over 150 government and academic
sources linking violence in schools and workplace productivity. United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 619, 631-644 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Souter extended his thanks to
Justice Breyer, and encouraged Congress to "help" the Court in the future. "The research
underlying Justice Breyer's dissent was necessarily a major undertaking; help is welcome,
and it not incidentally shrinks the risk that judicial research will miss material scattered
across the public domain or buried under pounds of legislative record." Id. at 614 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). How charming that Legislature No. 2 should ask Legislature No. 1 for assistance!
216. Some scholars, apparently unconcerned about respecting the separation of powers,
welcome this development. See John 0. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like
Law 25 CONST. COMMENT. 69, 71 (2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court through the
briefing process is a "superior fact-finder" to Congress and also less "biased"); Caitlin E.
Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding,84 IND. L.J. 1, 40-46
(2009) (contending that judicial fact-finding is superior to that of legislatures). See also
Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward A General Theory Of The Establishment Clause, 82 Nw, U. L. REV.
1113, 1193 (1988) (arguing that "institutional characteristics" permit the Court "to make
decisions that are politically and morally superior to the decisions reached by the
majoritarian process").
217. Justice Potter Stewart sounded a cautionary note in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223
(1978). After reading Justice Blackmun's social-science-laden plurality opinion on why fiveperson juries violated the Sixth Amendment, but six-person juries did not, he questioned the
wisdom and necessity of "heavy reliance on numerology derived from statistical studies."
Furthermore, he said, "neither the validity nor the methodology employed by the studies
cited was subjected to the traditional testing mechanisms of the adversary process. The
studies relied on merely represent unexamined findings of persons interested in the jury
system." Id. at 246 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
218. Two professors suggest formalizing the Court's legislative process by appointing "a
panel of resident social scientists, who would be requested to investigate matters of legislative
fact which appear to the Court to require further study." Miller & Barron, supra note 200, at
1240-42. See generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits
on Independent Research, 28 REv. LITIG. 131 (2008) (recommending formalizing ethical and
procedural rules governing independent research by judges).
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B. Legislating the Living Constitution:Justice William Brennan,Jr.
1. Policy Maker
At the age of ninety, six years after retiring from the bench and within a
year of his death, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. reiterated his staunch
dedication to a legislative definition of the judicial role.219 Fealty to the text
of the Constitution and to the intent of the Framers was secondary, even
unhelpful. "The genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it
may have had in a world that is dead and gone but in the adaptability of its
great principles to cope with current problems and present needs."22 0
Declaring his "faith in a malleable Constitution . .. infused with a vision of
human dignity,"2 2' Brennan freely employed the judicial office effectively to
further his personal vision of justice.222 Decrying the death penalty as fatal
to human dignity because it treats "members of the human race as
nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded,"223 he nonetheless

219. William

J. Brennan, Jr., My Life on the Court, in

REVOLUTION OR CONFIRMATION? 9

THE BURGER COURT: COUNTER-

(Bernard Schwartz ed., 1998) [hereinafter Brennan, My

L fe].
220. Id. at 10. "Justice Brennan has not pretended that the constitutional revolution in
which he has played a leading role was dictated by the text of the Constitution or by the
intentions of its framers." Richard A. Posner, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104
HARV. L. REv. 13, 14 (1990).
221. Brennan, My Life, supranote 219, at 10.
222. "[T]he most important and influential official in terms of domestic social policy
during the last half of the twentieth century was an unelected, electorally unremovable
official, Justice Brennan, whom most Americans could not identify." Lino. A. Graglia,
Originalism and the Constitution: Does Originalism Always Provide the Answer?, 34 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 73, 88 (2011). See also David Halberstram, The Common Man as
Uncommon Man, in REASON & PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN'S ENDURING INFLUENCE 24 (E.
Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997) ("quite likely the dominating figure of
the Court over more than a third of a century, and equally likely the most influential political
figure in America in the postwar years"); MORTON J.HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 8 (1998) ("the most important intellectual influence on the Warren
Court); Chief Judge Richard A. Posner, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARv. L.
REv. 9, 14 (1997) (affirming "Brennan's historical importance as a central figure in a judicial
revolution"); Anthony Lewis, Reason and Passion, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1997, at A17
("probably the most influential justice of the century") (quoting remarks of Justice Antonin
Scalia); Hon. Daniel J. O'Hern, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 8 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 313, 313 (1998) ("the dominant influence on American law in the twentieth
century"). For a detailed biography based on unrestricted access to case documents and
former clerks, see STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 211.
223. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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unwaveringly upheld the court-decreed slaughter of the unborn.224 Behind
the scenes, he was its chief architect. 225 Brennan matched this hypocrisy 2 26
with a cloying self-righteousness. "If I have drawn one lesson in my ninety
years, it is this: To strike another blow for freedom allows a man to walk a
little taller and raise his head a little higher. And while he can, he must."227
And while he could, he did: a primary author of a holocaust of unborn
human life that far exceeds in the annals of infant slaughter the combined
224. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 524 (1990) (joining
dissent from upholding of judicial bypass procedure because the procedure tends to
discourage abortion); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 537 (1989) (joining
concurring and dissenting opinion, reaffirming Roe without modification); Thornburgh v.
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking requirements for
mandatory informed-consent information and attendance of a second physician for a postviability abortion); Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (striking
requirements for 24-hour waiting period, performance of second-trimester abortions in a
hospital, parental consent or judicial bypass for minors under fifteen, physician provision of
information about risks of abortion, and humane disposal of fetal remains); Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 329 (1980) (dissenting from denial of Medicaid funding for abortion); Beal v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 448 (1977) (same); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(striking parental consent, spousal consent, and a ban on saline abortions); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (striking all state laws outlawing abortion).
225. Although he authored 1360 separate opinions (majority, dissenting, and other),
more than any other justice in history except for William 0. Douglas, Brennan did not write
a single majority opinion in the major abortion cases. See supra note, at 224. Conceptualizing
behind the scenes, however, he urged Justice Harry Blackmun to abandon vagueness as a
rationale for overturning the Texas statute in Roe, and instead to base the opinion on the
"core issue" of a right to abortion. Martin Wishnatsky, The Roll of the Log: Behind the Scenes
at Roe v. Wade, 1 LIBERTY LEGAL J. 10, 12 n.19 (2010). Previously, Brennan had strongly
recommended that Justice Douglas adopt a "right to privacy" approach in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), thus laying the doctrinal basis for the abortion right. STERN
& WERMIEL, supra note 211, at 283-85. See also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED
OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 237-39 (1985); David J. Garrow, Reproductive Rights and

Liberties: the Long Road to Roe, in REASON & PASSION, supra note 222, at 110-11. Writing for
the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the contraceptive right of
Griswold to the unmarried), Justice Brennan cleverly stated that the right to privacy included
"the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Use of the word "bear" deliberately
foreshadowed Roe, then pending before the Court. See STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 211, at
370; MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK 58-60 (2005); Garrow, supra, at 113. Brennan used

Eisenstadt "as another strong leg on which a future opinion legalizing abortions could
stand." KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR. AND THE DECISIONS
THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 226 (1993).

226. "Odd how liberals prate about morality when it comes to saving vicious killers from
a richly deserved fate, but have no breath to spare for the lives of the innocent, born or
unborn." JUDGE ROBERT H. DIERKER JR., THE TYRANNY OF TOLERANCE 94 (2006).

227. Brennan, My Life, supra note 219, at 12 (90th birthday speech in 1996).
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villainy of Pharaoh and Herod.228 Insistent on writing into the Constitution
his own ungodly values, Brennan is a sober reminder that the "genius of the
Constitution" lies in its purposeful design to thwart anyone from wielding
the oligarchical power he enjoyed for thirty-four years and celebrated until
his dying breath. "Too many wrongs cry out to be righted,"2 2 9 he wrote in
his last year on earth, unaware that his own work as a judicial legislator
stands as one of the greatest of these wrongs. The Constitution, Brennan
wrote a decade earlier, "is a sparkling vision of the supremacy of the human
dignity of every individual."23 0 Every individual, that is, except those waiting
to be born.
Brennan enlarged the traditional judicial role of resolving disputes
between litigants to take on the grandiose task of directing "the course of
vital social, economic, and political currents."2 3 ' He welcomed public
interest litigation that bypassed the legislative arena by "casting social,
economic, philosophical, and political questions in the form of lawsuits."232
The Constitution, in his hands, became a means for resolving "the most
fundamental issues confronting our democracy" and a vehicle "to resolve
public controversies."2 33 Though not alone in this pretense, he consciously
saw his role as speaking for the community on "issues upon which
contemporary society is most deeply divided."2 34

228. Exodus 1:15-22; Matthew 2:13-18. During the period from the issuance of the Roe v.
Wade opinion in 1973 until Brennan's retirement from the Court in 1990, 25 million
abortions were performed in the United States. Rachel K. Jones & Kathryn Kooistra,
Abortion Incidence and Access to Services in the United States, 2008, 43 PERSPS. ON SEXUAL &
REPROD. HEALTH 41, 43 (2011), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/
4304111.pdf. By the time he died in 1997, the total had risen to 35 million. Id. By 2008 the
number had further increased to 49 million. Id.
229. Brennan, My Life, supra note 219, at 11.
230. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification,27 S. TEX. L. REv. 433, 439 (1986) [hereinafter Brennan, Ratification].
231. Id. at 434.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id; accord Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The
Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 159, 161 ("[I1n so many areas the Supreme Court today
views constitutional litigation as a means of settling the great conflicts of the social order.");
STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 211, at xiii (Justice Brennan "came to embody an assertive
vision for the courts in which judges aggressively tackled the nation's most complicated and
divisive social problems.").
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Brennan viewed the Constitution as a license to legislate his vision of
justice into law. 235 He enjoyed the thrill of absolute power. "[lt's a pretty
awesome feeling, believe me," he said, "to appreciate that something you're
doing, when it's decided, will have an enormous impact among two
hundred-odd million people. And that feeling never leaves you." 236 Noble or
ignoble as this aspiration might have been, it far exceeds, indeed
transgresses, the judicial role envisioned by the Founders.2 37 Similarly, the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, mindful of Dred Scott,23 8 lodged
implementation with Congress, not the Court.239 Brennan exercised power
he did not lawfully possess. He is almost universally lauded as perhaps the
most effective Supreme Court justice of the twentieth century. But few
contemplate that his success arose from the exercise of illegitimate power.
The constitutional design is for Congress to be the legislative body, not
the Court. "The goal of universal equality, freedom and prosperity is far
from won[,]" Brennan asserted in his final year on the Court, and "ugly
inequities continue to mar the face of our nation." 24 0 If combating perceived
social ills was his purpose, he should have-like his father 241-run for public
235. "I was finally convinced," Brennan noted in a personal history of one case, "that
affirmative action programs were not only justified as a matter of history and constitutional
principle, but that they were sorely needed if the place of minorities in society were ever to
advance." Epstein & Knight, Piercing the Veil, supra note 177, at 357. Justice Harry
Blackmun uttered similar sentiments. Dissenting from the Court's refusal to command that
Medicaid pay for abortion, he stated: "This is a sad day for those who regard the
Constitution as a force that would serve justice to all evenhandedly and, in so doing, would
better the lot of the poorest among us." Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The Justice Department later criticized the "free-ranging, essentially legislative,
process of devising regulatory schemes that reflect [judicial] notions of morality and social
justice." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Thornburgh v.
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (Nos. 84-495 & 84-1379),
1985 WL 669620 at *20 (alteration in original).
236. Nat Hentoff, Profiles: The Constitutionalist,NEW YORKER, Mar. 12, 1990, at 54; see
also id. at 70 ("It's just incredible ... to be a participant in decisions that have such enormous
impact on our society."). Justice Blackmun also enjoyed the thrill of being the ultimate policy
maker. "[I]t has been exciting," he explained, "to be centrally placed in the development and
resolution of an issue that is so decisive and emotional. . . ." The Justice Harry A. Blackmun
Oral History Project 505 (1994-95), http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/blackmun.
237. See supra, § II.
238. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
239. See supra, § III(C).
240. Hentoff, supra note 236, at 68. Justice Douglas shared a similar vision. See WILLIAM
0. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION 95 (1970) (stating that "today's Establishment is the new
George III").
241.

STERN &WERMIEL, supra note 211, at 9-12, 14-16.
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office and practiced the legislative arts in the branch of government
designated for that purpose. Instead, joining with like-minded oligarchs, he
malformed a judicial institution into a legislative one. The Court needs to
be shorn of its legislative functions, and returned to the judicial role of
deciding particular cases, rather than setting social policy. In a republican
form of government, the people are entitled to corrupt or ennoble
themselves through their own elected representatives, rather than by the
policy inclinations of unelected judges appointed for life. When judges
usurp the legislative function, they also enervate the democratic process.
Complaining about a particularly egregious example, Chief Justice Warren
Burger stated:
[W]hen this Court rushes in to remedy what it perceives to be
the failings of the political processes, it deprives those processes
of an opportunity to function. When the political institutions are
not forced to exercise constitutionally allocated powers and
responsibilities, those powers, like muscles not used, tend to
atrophy.242
2. Minority Whip of the Court
Justice Brennan joined Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and
243
Douglas to form a strong four-justice liberal bloc on the Court. He
functioned as the "whip," keeping track of the voting alignment on
particular cases, and trolling for a fifth vote while monitoring his own side
for potential defections.2 " The logic of judicial opinions was a means to an
end, frequently a calculated compromise to win a majority for
incrementally advancing the liberal agenda.245 Brennan often sought to
establish a narrow foothold in one case as a basis for expansion in the
future.2" The liberal bloc also used certiorari grants as a means of furthering
242. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 253 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
243. STERN &WERMIEL, supra note 211, at 157-58.
244. Id. at 158 (describing Brennan as "the group's strategist, scouting out opportunities
to advance their views and plotting out how a current loss could contribute to future
victories").
245. "We were plowing new ground," Brennan explained. "And when you do that sort of
thing, you make progress by stages. You don't do it in one fell swoop." Id. at 240.
246. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962), as one example, established the justiciability
of apportionment challenges as a prelude to Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) ("one
person, one vote") (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). "With the principle of
intervention once established in Baker, . . . the Court could go on to successively tougher
cases, each following the 'command' of the Constitution as expressed in the holding or
dictum of the last .... a process of de facto constitutional amendment." Ward E. Y. Elliott,
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their agenda, looking for promising cases which could be employed to
create desired outcomes."' Since a cert grant required only four votes, the
bloc could call up any case that suited their purposes, as long as they could
reasonably anticipate finding a fifth vote to control the outcome.24 8
Brennan sifted cert petitions in search of helpful vehicles to implement a
predetermined policy agenda. 249 He described one petition as an "ideal
opportunity" to apply a rule of criminal procedure against the states. "I do
think," he wrote to his liberal confreres, "we'll wait a long time before we get
a question as sharply presented." Although fearful the fifth vote might not
be found, his inclination was "to vote to grant and take a chance." 2so In the
late 60s, he was looking through cert. petitions in search of the "ideal
vehicle" to transform welfare payments from a privilege to a property-like
entitlement whose deprivation required due process. He finally found a
petition, his biographer writes, "that presented the issue exactly as he
hoped."25 1 Although he could not assemble a majority to recognize a
constitutional right to receive welfare, he did succeed in the due process

campaign. 252

THE RISE OF GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT's ROLE IN VOTING RIGHTS DIsPUTES,

1845-1969, at 115-16 (1974). A New York Times reporter, present for the announcement of
the decision in Sims, felt like he was at "the second American Constitutional Convention."
Anthony Lewis, The Legacy of the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE
398, 398 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996). The run-up to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was
similar. See supra note 225. Brennan deliberately teed up a doctrine in one case and then
proliferated it into future opinions, citing the first case as precedent. See Laurence H. Tribe,
In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REv. 41, 44 (1997) (noting "Justice
Brennan's work as constitutional architect: his ability to decide a case, and particularly to
craft an opinion, in a way that would lay the foundation for future decisions").
247. "Brennan viewed culling through potential cases as a critically important part of his
role as a justice, in part because it was the means by which he flagged promising strategic
opportunities." STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 211, at 363; see also William J.Maledon, Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr.: A Personal Tribute, 22 ARIz. ST. L.J. 823, 826 n.8 ("Justice Brennan
personally read and considered every petition to the Court ..
248. STERN &WERMIEL, supra note 211, at 158.
249. Brennan and Warren regularly strategized "to decide which cases might work best
for incorporating the requirements of the Bill of Rights against the states." Id. at 251.
250. Id. at 183.
251. Id. at 336-41.
252. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that procedural due process
entitles welfare recipients to a pretermination hearing). Justice Harlan was careful to require
that Brennan's majority opinion contain no reference to a substantive due process right to
receive welfare, lest even a negative mention be exploited in the future. See STERN &
WERMIEL, supra note 211, at 343 ("[Mlany of Brennan's colleagues learned to watch for the
seemingly innocuous casual statement or footnote-seeds that would be exploited to their
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The liberal bloc, later augmented seriatim by Justices Goldberg, Fortas,
and Marshall, did not simply apply the law to cases that came before the
Court.25 3 Instead, they actively sought out cases that fit their agenda and
used them as vehicles to change the law. In that process, the result of the
4
case was far more important than the opinion itself.2 5 Brennan willingly
and frequently sacrificed the quality and even the logic of an opinion to
"put a court together."255 One commentator, himself a former clerk
characterized Baker v. Carr,2 56 a case that recognized a right, but provided
little guidance on remedy, as "a perfect illustration of Brennan's willingness
to say virtually anything (or nothing) if a key member of his majority
requested it, so long as the opinion reached the right outcome."257 In
another case, Brennan had sought to declare illegal immigrants a "suspect
5
class" and to create a fundamental right to education for their children.
He had to backtrack on both goals to keep a majority to declare the law
unconstitutional.259 To get the result, Brennan had to dilute the doctrine.
One law professor commented that the case "ha[d] no doctrinal significance
logical extreme in a later case."); see also JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT 124
(2007) (relating that Justice Powell warned Justice O'Connor that Brennan "tended to
include footnotes in his opinions that he would later argue were major points of law"); Mark
Tushnet, Justice Lewis F. Powell and the Jurisprudence of Centrism, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1854,
1873 n.153 (1995) [hereinafter Tushnet, Powell] (noting Brennan's practice "of planting
seeds for later, liberal development").
253. Justice Hugo Black, a proponent of applying the Bill of Rights against the States, was
sternly opposed to the recognition of unenumerated rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 525 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). He resisted his liberal colleagues when they
condoned a broad "right to privacy." See id. at 507-10. He also drifted away from the liberal
bloc on issues of civil disobedience and continuing expansion of criminal procedure
protections. Thus, the battle for the fifth vote continued, even with the addition of first
Goldberg and then Fortas. STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 211, at 287-89. With the
confirmation of Thurgood Marshall in August, 1967, the bloc again had a reliable fifth vote.
Id. at 294-95.
254. "As in most of his monumental decisions, Brennan reached the decision first, then
worked on the best reasoning that could 'capture a court.'" EISLER, supra note 225, at 225.
255. Maledon, supra note 247, at 824. See also STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 211, at 183
(noting Brennan's "willingness to sacrifice the quality of an opinion's legal reasoning to get
the outcome he wanted").
256. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (recognizing an equal protection right to
challenge malapportionment).
257. STERN &WERMIEL, supra note 211, at 190 (quoting POWE, supra note 161, at 202).
258. Tushnet, Themes, supra note 174, at 764-66.
259. Id. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). For details of Brennan's unsuccessful
effort to gain Justice Powell's assent to these doctrinal innovations, see Tushnet, Powell,
supra note 252, at 1862-73.
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except ... that it embodies the view that the Court can find unconstitutional
statutes that a majority of the Justices believe to be unwise social policy."2 60
These practices are quintessentially legislative. A measure of a
Congressman is his ability to "move legislation." 26 ' To do so, he must be
able to craft bills, attract needed votes, rally public opinion, and "manage
the procedural intricacies necessary to see a bill enacted into law."26 2 Votetracking is a key skill. "At bottom," wrote a former Senate staffer,
"legislatures are organized vote-counting bodies." 2 63 Brennan's role in the
liberal bloc was very similar to that of a party whip. The objective of party
whips, who serve as the assistant majority and minority leaders, "is to win
votes for legislation supported by their parties and to determine whether
certain legislation has sufficient support within the body."264 Party leaders
rely on the whips to "know where the votes are." 265 Brennan served the same
function, corralling the votes of other justices and keeping track of the
tally. 2 66 Additionally, he screened the cert petitions for good cases that
would further the "party" agenda. On Thursdays, prior to the Court's
weekly Friday conference, he caucused with his "party leader," Earl
Warren.267
To be effective, a whip needs early intelligence about voting alignments.
Unlike a Congressional whip, who must keep count of 100 senators or 435
representatives, Brennan only had to track eight other votes besides his
own. The Court typically assembles in conference every Friday to vote on
cases argued earlier in the week. To be most effective in Conference,
Brennan had to know ahead of time how his colleagues were leaning. He
accomplished this through the clerks' underground. One clerk relates:
We might find out, from his or her clerk, where a Justice is
leaning on a particular case. When we know what that Justice is
thinking, we keep that in mind when we write out two-page
260. Tushnet, Themes, supra note 174, at 765.
261. Michael Edmund O'Neill, A Legislative Scorecard for the United States Senate:
EvaluatingLegislative Productivity,36 J.LEGIS. 297, 298 (2010).
262. Id. at 299.
263. Id.

264. Id. at 306.
265. Id. See Ceci Connolly, Plain-TalkingHastert Poised to Be Speaker, Wash. Post, Dec.
21, 1998, at Al, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/govt/leadership/stories/
hastertl22198.htm (describing Majority Whip Tom Delay and Deputy Whip Dennis Hastert
as building "a vote-counting operation that is the envy of other Republicans").
266. "Brennan liked building majorities," wrote his biographers. He was "tasked by the
chief justice with corralling majorities." STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 211, at 352.
267. Id. at 250-52.
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summaries of each case for Brennan to emphasize at the
conference. The points he hits may be pitched entirely to that
one Justice.268
During opinion-writing in a close case, the same process occurred: "While
an opinion is being written in our chambers," recalled a Brennan clerk, "we
might talk to a clerk for a Justice who we knew would be a tough fifth vote.
And we would ask this clerk what was really bugging his guy about
Brennan's draft."2 69
3.

The Rule of Five

As minority and, at times, majority whip, Brennan kept close track of his
colleagues positions on pending cases, gauging how far he could push the
liberal agenda without losing a majority and, alternatively, what doctrinal
concessions he must make to keep one. "He sees his life's work," wrote a
journalist, "as a continual battle for five votes .... ."270 He initiated new
clerks into the importance of collecting votes. His biographers relate:
Brennan liked to greet his new clerks each fall by asking them
what they thought was the most important thing they needed to
know as they began their work in his chambers. The pair of
stumped novices would watch quizzically as Brennan held up
five fingers. Brennan then explained that with five votes, you
could accomplish anything.271
Some clerks report that Brennan identified the Rule of Five as "the most
important rule in constitutional law."2 72 At his annual clerks' reunion,
"Brennan spoke so candidly over dinner about how the votes were lining up
in pending cases that his former clerks felt for one night like they had never

268. Hentoff, supra note 236, at 60 (quoting Jeffrey Leeds, 1985-86 clerk for Justice
Brennan).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 70.
271. STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 211, at 196. See also id. at 278 (Brennan "welcomed

each new pair of clerks every summer by raising five fingers to stress the importance on the
Court of five votes.").
272. Tushnet, Themes, supra note 174, at 763. See also Hentoff, supra note 236, at 60
(quoting Brennan's "five-finger speech": "'Five votes. Five votes can do anything around
here."').
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left his chambers." 27 3 Brennan trained his clerks as vote-hunters-junior
whips.274
C. Solidifying the Imperium: ChiefJustice William Rehnquist
The Warren Court imposed upon the states policies deemed wise by a
majority of the Justices. The Rehnquist Court, by contrast, clashed with
Congress over legislation perceived to intrude on state sovereignty.275 On
the prerogative of the Court to exercise monopoly control over the meaning
of the Constitution, however, the Rehnquist Court did not vary from its
predecessors.276 In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court assailed Congress for
daring to employ its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power contrary
to a Supreme Court interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.
In Dickerson v. United States,27 8 the Court rebuked Congress for
legislating its own view on the admissibility of confessions.27 9 In 1968,
Congress had passed a law that Miranda warnings 280 were not mandatory,

273. STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 211, at 291.
274. The impressive skill set Brennan employed to lobby his Supreme Court colleagues
should not be underestimated. He had a keen intellect as well as a warm personality. See
William Cohen, Book Review, Justice in the Balance, 81 VA. L. REv. 927, 929 (1995) (stating
that Brennan's "influence stemmed as much from his warm personality as from the strength
of his ideas"). Justice Brennan's "lobbying" occurred largely through the exchange of opinion
drafts that creatively accommodated the views of his fellow justices. See Hentoff, supra note
236, at 59. Additionally, he was a very hard worker, rising early and working late. See
Maledon, supra note 247, at 824 n.2 (remarking on Justice Brennan's "astonishing and
indefatigable pace"); Hentoff, supra note 236, at 70 (quoting Brennan that his work on the
Court "takes up practically all your waking hours"). By sheer energy, determination, and
industriousness, Brennan gained an edge. Thinking strategically, he gave his all-working
the internal politics of the Court to achieve his vision of justice.
275. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (Congress has no power
under Article I to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from suit in federal court.); accord
Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. States Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (same for federal
administrative hearing); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (same for action in state
court).
276. "[T]he fiercest opposition is mounted to protect the Supreme Court's authority to
interpret the Constitution. That authority lies at the core of the Supreme Court's power
since, when exercised, it is virtually unchallengeable." Lepre v. Dep't of Labor, 275 F.3d 59,
74 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Silberman, J., concurring).
277. See supra note 145.
278. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
279. Id. at 437.
280. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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but only factors to consider in evaluating voluntariness. 281 Because the
Justice Department decided not to rely on § 3501 in prosecutions, the
statute lay dormant for decades.282 In 1999, a Fourth Circuit panel,
responding to an amicus brief, raised § 3501 sua sponte.2 83 Citing Supreme
Court precedent that the Miranda warnings were not constitutionally
mandated, but only a "prophylactic" rule and "not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution," the panel found that statutory law prevailed
over a judicial rule of evidence. 284 As a result, the defendant's voluntary
confession, though not preceded by the Miranda warnings, was deemed
admissible.285
To lessen the effect of Miranda on law enforcement, the Supreme Court
had previously allowed admission of unwarned confessions for
impeachment purposes,28 and also identified a "public safety" exception
when immediate application of the warnings before talking with a suspect
could endanger the public.2 " The Miranda warnings thus functioned more
as a protective force field around the Fifth Amendment rule against selfincrimination than as a constitutional requirement per se. As such,
Congress's express Section 5 authority under the Fourteenth Amendment
"to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article," should
have given the legislators a clear field to substitute their view of Fifth
Amendment implementation for that of the Justices. But this could not be
allowed.288
Even though conservative majorities had previously vitiated the
disqualifying impact of failure to provide the iconic warnings, the liberal
Justices, quasi-conservative Justices, and Chief Justice closed ranks to resist
any Congressional intrusion into their monopoly power to define and
implement the Constitution. 28 9 Faced with a congressional alternative to
281. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (2010), invalidated by Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
(2000).
282. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 680-82 (4th Cir. 1999).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 689 (citations omitted).
285. Id. at 695.
286. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
287. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984) (noting that "failure to provide
Miranda warnings in and of itself does not render a confession involuntary").
288. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 460 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
power with which the Court would endow itself under a 'prophylactic' justification for
Miranda goes far beyond what it has permitted Congress to do under authority of [Section
5].").
289. Christopher Wolfe explains that "the Rehnquist Court is composed of three
different blocs: first, a politically liberal modern bloc (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter),
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judicial policy making, Legislature No. 2 firmly closed the door on
Legislature No. 1.290 No, Mr. Legislator, you do not play on the
constitutional ball field. To shift metaphors, no congressional cooks in the
constitutional kitchen! "In sum," stated the Dickerson majority, reversing
the Fourth Circuit, "we conclude that Miranda announced a constitutional
rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively." 291
Although not designated as such, the Court actually legislated a Fifth
Amendment penumbra, and then imposed it on Congress as a
constitutional mandate. After all, as Justice Scalia noted, "§ 3501 excludes
from trial precisely what the Constitution excludes from trial, viz.,
compelled confessions." 292 Describing the Court's result as "power-judging,"
and protesting against the Court's imposition of its own legislative rules on
the constitutionally-designated legislature, 2 93 Justice Scalia decried "the
power of the Supreme Court to write a prophylactic, extraconstitutional
Constitution, binding on Congress and the States." 294 By a 7-2 margin, the
"conservative" Rehnquist Court validated one of the landmarks of the
Warren era. Protecting the exclusivity of the Court's access to the
constitutional arena trumped more customary policy inclinations.295
second, a centrist modern bloc that is typically, but not always, conservative (O'Connor,
Kennedy), and third, a traditional bloc (Scalia, Thomas), with Rehnquist himself straddling
the last two blocs." Christopher Wolfe, The Rehnquist Court, in THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL:
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION 199, 204 (Christopher Wolfe ed. 2004). In
Dickerson, only the core traditionalists dissented.
290. "Chief Justice Rehnquist was hardly a fan of Miranda but nevertheless wrote
Dickerson in order to highlight the deference he felt lawmakers owed to Court
interpretations of the Constitution." Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court
Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEo. L.J. 1515, 1576 n.339 (2010).
291. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (majority opinion). Four years after Dickerson, when
judicial superiority was not an issue, the Chief Justice reverted to his historic anti-Miranda
stance. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (joining Justice Thomas' plurality
opinion that evidence acquired as a result of an unwarned statement does not violate the
Fifth Amendment).
292. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 445 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V
("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . .")
with 18 U.S.C. 3501(a) (A confession "shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily
given.").
293. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 446, 460 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing Miranda's
"detailed code" as a "legislative achievement").
294. Id. at 461.
295. That the warnings ("You have a right to remain silent. Anything you say. . . .") had
become embedded in popular culture also influenced the Court. Why disappoint the public
by disavowing the memorable phrases that every policeman carried on a tattered card in his
wallet, and countless dramas had engraved on the public mind? See id. at 443 (majority
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"The Supreme Court," writes one scholar, "has made the Fourteenth
Amendment a blank check, authorizing the Court to arrogate to itself
29 6
policymaking on any issue in which the justices take an interest." If
Boerne and Dickerson are any indication, the Rehnquist Court, inheriting
the checkbook from its predecessors, continued to write.2 97
V. REMEDIES

The lifetime appointment, meant to protect the Constitution from
2 98
political manipulation, became instead the "divine right of judges" to
shape society according to their vision of "social progress."299 "Like a jealous
Cyclops," wrote one commentator, "[the Court] was willing to rule the
domain that it guarded."300 "Ultimate legislative power in the United
States," a New Deal strategist concluded, "has come to rest in the Supreme
Court." 0 ' What can be done?
A. The Appointment Power
The greatest form of popular control over the Court is the appointment
302
power-jointly shared between the President and the Senate. The Court is
not self-perpetuating. Unlike some boards of directors, the justices do not
opinion) ("Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the
warnings have become part of our national culture."). Justice Scalia was unmoved by this
affection for the Court's "extra constitutional constraints upon Congress and the States." Id.
at 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
296. Lino Graglia, Joseph Grano and Judicial Review, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1419, 1422
(2000).
297. See Jules Lobel, The Supreme Court and Enemy Combatants,54 WAYNE L. REv. 1131,
1135 (2008) (noting "the increased confidence of the judiciary in its relations with Congress
and the Executive, an assertiveness that transcends the liberal and conservative labels");
Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal
ConstitutionalLaw, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 656, 657, 662 (2000) ("The concept that the Supreme
Court is the ultimate, and in some cases exclusive, interpreter of the Constitution flourished
in the 1990s. . . . The theory places the Supreme Court at the apex of a pyramid that
encompasses all other government officials.").
298. "The divine right of judges has supplanted ... the institutions of parliamentary
democracy, and the Constitution itself." Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46
YALE L.J. 1290, 1307 (1937).
299. Brennan, Ratification,supra note 231, at 436.
300. Lerner, supra note 298, at 1309.
301.

ADOLF BERLE, THE THREE FACES OF POWER 3 (1967).

302. The President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court[.]" U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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choose their successors.303 The electoral tides that shape the Presidency and
the Senate determine the selection pool and the viability of judicial
nominees. Although, in 1937, the Court arguably changed direction to
deflect a clash with the elected branches,3 " President Roosevelt's
opportunity to select seven new justices in four years30 s mooted any
lingering conservatism. In 1936, manufacturing, mining, and agriculture
were beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause.306 By 1941, however, the
same Commerce Clause empowered Congress to regulate wheat grown for
consumption on a farm. 307 The court-packing plan was no more than the
presidential appointment power turbocharged. President Roosevelt sought
to appoint a coadjutor for every judge over 70.30' The plan seemed
audacious at the time: a sudden addition of six new justices. 0 ' Nevertheless,
it had the great appeal of being a variant of the appointing powerhistorically the most effective way to move the Court ideologically.1 oAs one
Senator stated: "When the judges change, the law changes. "31

303. Non-profit corporations, lacking shareholders, often select new board members by
vote of the current board, especially if the organization has no members or excludes them
from governance. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost of
Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REv. 829, 830 (2003) (stating that "selfperpetuating boards are the norm . . . particularly among charitable or public benefit
nonprofits").
304. For a typical history of the "switch in time," see WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND
THE COURT 53-62 (1962). For more detail, including the genesis of the court-packing plan in
the Justice Department, see William Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's
"Courtpacking"Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REv. 347, 389 (1966) (crediting Princeton professor
Edward S. Corwin with originating the "age-limit proposal").
305. Hugo Black (1937), Stanley Reed (1938), Felix Frankfurter (1939), William 0.
Douglas (1939), Frank Murphy (1940), James F. Byrnes (1941), Robert H. Jackson (1941).
See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
306. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) ("[T]he local character of mining,
of manufacturing, and of crop growing is a fact, and remains a fact, whatever may be done
with the products.").
307. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942).
308. Leuchtenburg, supra note 304, at 395.
309. When Roosevelt submitted the legislation to Congress on February 5, 1937, see
Leuchtenburg, supra note 304, at 399, six justices were over 70: Louis Brandeis (80), Willis
Van Devanter (77), James McReynolds (75), George Sutherland (74), Charles Evans Hughes
(74), and Pierce Butler (70). See BiographicalDirectoryof FederalJudges,supra note 305.
310. In the view of one scholar, the New Deal revolution was not the result of
conservative Justices wilting under the pressure of the court-packing plan, but it was instead
solely the consequence of retirements opening the way to appointment of pro-New Deal
justices. See Barry Cushman, Regime Theory and Unenumerated Rights: A CautionaryNote, 9
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When the Court imposed abortion-on-demand as a constitutional
requirement,312 the nation split between libertine supporters of its
mandate313 and Christian resisters of this offense against the sanctity of
life.3 14 The controversy fueled political party conflict and redefinition.
Libertines aligned with the Democrats, and pro-life Christians with the
Republicans."' By mobilizing Baptists-traditionally wary of aspiring for
earthly power-and evangelicals to register and vote for a pro-life president,
Jerry Falwell significantly contributed to Ronald Reagan's election in
1980.316 This polarization made the Supreme Court appointment process a
political battleground and the Court itself a focus of the vehemence."
The battle over appointments waxed red-hot when President Ronald
Reagan nominated Judge Robert Bork to replace retiring Justice Lewis
Powell.318 A year before, the nomination of Antonin Scalia, also a
conservative, raised hardly a peep of opposition.319 Before Scalia's
J. CONST. L. 263, 278 (2006) ("The appointments process . . . was the mechanism
through which this particular jurisprudential transformation was achieved.").
311. George W. Norris (I-Neb.), 80 CONG. REC. 1887 (1936).
312. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973), the Court purported to allow a postviability ban on abortion, but the broad discretion allowed to the physician throughout
pregnancy in the companion case of Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 made this option
meaningless.
313. See generally RICKIE SOLLINGER, PREGNANCY AND POWER: A SHORT HISTORY OF
U. PA.

REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS IN AMERICA (2007)
314. See generally RANDALL A. TERRY, OPERATION RESCUE

(1988).
315. The grass-roots activists-radical, feminist Democrats and fundamentalist,
Christian Republicans-pulled the two parties in opposite directions doctrinally, sharpening
Congressional conflict over judicial appointments. See generally NANCY SCHERER, SCORING
POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS

(2005).

316.

MACEL FALWELL & SEAN HANNITY, JERRY FALWELL: His LIFE AND LEGACY 107-30

(2008).

317. "We can now look forward to at least another Term with carts full of mail from the
public, and streets full of demonstrators . . . ." Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490, 535 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 379 (1985) ("Roe v.
Wade... occasioned searing criticism of the Court, over a decade of demonstrations, a
stream of vituperative mail addressed to Justice Blackmun .... ").
318. Nomination of Robert H. Bork To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, 1 PUB. PAPERS 736-37 (July 1, 1987).

319. Scalia was confirmed 98-0 on September 17, 1986. 132 CONG. REC. 23,813 (1986).
Having just grilled Rehnquist for a week on his nomination to be Chief Justice, the Senators
may have exhausted their zeal for scrutinizing Reagan court nominees. Senator Howell
Heflin observed: "Scalia may be Italian, but he has the luck of the Irish." Judith Lichtman,
Public Interest Groups and the Bork Nomination, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 978, 978 (1990); see also
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confirmation, the Court had three justices who regularly dissented from the
abortion regime created in Roe: Byron White and William Rehnquist, the
two original Roe dissenters,3 20 and Sandra Day O'Connor.32 ' O'Connor's
views appeared to indicate principled opposition to Roe.3 22 Thus, with Scalia
added to the Court, the abortion majority had apparently shrunk to five
justices.3 23 Threatening to tip the balance, Judge Bork provoked the furies.
As one scholar stated: "Obviously, when Justice Powell resigned, it was
widely felt that the swing vote on an increasingly polarized Court was 'up
for grabs' . . . . With the appointment of Judge Bork, it was felt, a new
conservative majority dedicated to radically transforming constitutional
doctrine would take power."32 Justice Scalia replaced Chief Justice Warren
Burger.3 25 Although Burger had voted, albeit with some cautionary
comments, for Roe and Doe,3 26 he had most recently dissented in an
abortion regulation case.3 27 Thus, Scalia's appointment did not, in the proabortionist's view, alter the balance of power on the Court. Although
describing Scalia as "very conservative," Joe Biden, Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, stated: "I do not, however, find him significantly
more conservative than Chief Justice Burger; therefore, I do not have undue

132 CONG. REc. 23,806 (1986) (statement of Sen. Robert Dole) ("Perhaps Judge Scalia
indirectly benefited from the 'controversy' that swirled around the Rehnquist nomination.").
320. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171-78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice White's
dissent appeared in the companion case of Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-23 (1973).
321. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452-75 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 814-33 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
322. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 461 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (finding that a "State's interest
in protecting potential human life exists throughout the pregnancy"); Thornburgh, 476 U.S.
at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the "Court's unworkable scheme for
constitutionalizing the regulation of abortion").
323. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens. A close reading of
Justice O'Connor's dissents would have indicated that her opposition to Roe was to the
degree of regulation prohibited, not to the abortion "liberty" per se. See supra notes 321-22.
324. Morton J.Horwitz, The Meaning of the Bork Nomination in American Constitutional
History, 50 U. Pirr L. REv. 655, 655 (1989).
325. Letter Accepting the Resignation of Warren E. Burger as Chief Justice of the United
States, 1 PUB. PAPERs 780 (June 17, 1986).
326. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 208 (1973) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Plainly, the
Court today rejects any claim that the Constitution requires abortions on demand.").
327. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 782-85
(1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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concern about the impact of this appointment on the balance of the
Court."328
Within an hour of the announcement of the Judge Bork nomination,
however, Senator Edward Kennedy unleashed a brutal attack, signaling allout war against the nomination.3 29 With Roe now in the balance, the
libertine power in American politics organized for battle. Rather than hold
hearings in the summer to enable seating of the new justice for the October
term, Senator Biden postponed the hearing until after Labor Day.330
Meanwhile, throughout the summer, the opponents of conservative
constitutionalism launched one ideological volley after another, accusing
Judge Bork in detail of all the egregious sins catalogued in Senator
Kennedy's initial broadside."' In Judge Bork's view, his potential to be the
fifth vote against Roe, rather than his conservative judicial philosophy per
se, animated the opposition.
I was perceived as the swing vote on abortion. I think Roe v.
Wade was probably the litmus issue. The opposition didn't want
a narrow focus on a matter that would be pending before the
Court, and a matter on which many people agreed with me, so
they got people all worked up about false and extraneous issues.
They used anything they could dream up, without regard to
truth.332
Senate rejection of the Bork nomination signaled a new and contentious
era in judicial appointments. Like competing tsunamis, the Reagan
Revolution and the formerly ascendant liberal consensus crashed into each

328. 132 CONG. REC. 23,805 (1986); see also id. (statement of Sen. Howard Metzenbaum)
(voting for Scalia "because I do not believe that his presence on the Court will shift the Court
dramatically and dangerously to the right").
329. James Reston, Kennedy and Bork, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1987, §4, at 15.
Robert Bork's America is a land in which women would be forced into backalley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated lunch counters, rogue police
could break down citizens' doors in midnight raids, schoolchildren could not
be taught about evolution, writers and artists could be censored at the whim of
the Government, and the doors of the Federal courts would be shut on the
fingers of millions of citizens.
Id.
330. Lichtman, supra note 319, at 979.
331. Id.
332. DC Bar, Legends in the Law: A Conversationwith Robert H. Bork, BAR REP., Dec./Jan.
available at http://www.dcbar.org/for-1awyers/resources/legends-in-the-law/
1998,
bork.cfm.
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other in boiling, acrimonious turmoil."' The myth of judicial aloofness and
impartiality dissolved in the roaring waves. The sensualist, for whom
pleasure without responsibility was a higher value than life, girded for battle
with a determined Christian remnant. "My body, my life" contended with
the divine commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," in a religious war to
enforce values in a legal realm not easily subject to legislative alteration."'
Each President tends to choose nominees who embody his side of the
struggle. But these same nominees, careful to avoid catalyzing a filibuster,
engage in a stylized, confirmation-hearing kabuki dance335 to seduce and
disarm their ideological rivals."' Aiming to gain long-term ascendancy on
the Court, Presidents-in most cases-nominate deeply-committed
partisans, chosen for youth as well as proven reliability.337 Sitting justices, in
turn, time retirements to hand the nomination of a successor to a President
whose views they approve.33 8 Post-Bork, the politicization of the judiciary
ascended to new heights, affecting the lower federal courts as well.
333. One judge lamented this continuing contest between "warring political and cultural
factions whose goal is nothing less than a Supreme Court constituted by nine justices, all
reflective of the point of view of the respective factions." Hon. Arrie W. Davis, The Richness
of Experience,Empathy, and the Role of a Judge: The Senate Confirmation Hearingsfor Judge
Sonia Sotomayor, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 2 (2009).
334. See supra notes 223-230 and accompanying text.
335. A "Kabuki dance" is a "traditional Japanese popular drama performed with highly
stylized
singing
and
dancing."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE
DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/kabuki. See Richard Brust, Supreme Court 2.0,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 2008, at 39 ("a Senate confirmation process that has been likened to a soap
opera or a Kabuki dance").
336. For a critique of this process, see Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS
(1994)).
337. "[P]eople now understand the role of the court in modern society when it comes to
social change. That's why we fight so hard to put on the court people who see the world like
us. That's true from the left, and that's true from the right." Sen. Graham Questions Judge
Sotomayor at Supreme Court Nomination Hearings, WASH. POST, July 16, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/16/AR2009071601659

.html (quoting Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC)). The stakes are high. Federal judges receive
lifetime appointments. Only one state (Rhode Island) has life tenure for judges. All the
others provide for removal by election, mandatory retirement, or legislative vote. Paul
Taylor, Congress's Power to Regulate the FederalJudiciary: What the First Congress and the
First Federal Courts Can Teach Today's Congress and Courts, 37 PEPP. L. REv. 847, 928-29
n.383 (2010).
338. Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life
Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'y 769, 774, 806-07 (2006) (noting that the
"current system allows for strategic timing of retirements [and] encourages the appointment
of young nominees to the Court"). The practice of timed retirement is not recent. The
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Five-four splits in the Supreme Court on major decisions reflect this
knife-edge balance of power. A sub-theme of every Presidential election is
who will fill openings on the Court. The post-election challenge is to pick a
nominee with impeccable legal credentials, the heart of a partisan, and the
paper trail of a eunuch. New appointments may alter the ideological balance
on the Court in either direction, but they rarely affect the Court's
institutional determination to maintain its position of supremacy. To
command the policy-making high ground, Presidents tend to appoint
skilled partisans to the Court, who have strong policy views and are masters
of the persuasive arts. Such individuals are unlikely to assume a modest
view of the Court's functions.
A vivid example of this practice came to light when Ed Whalen posted
online a confidential letter that Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe
wrote to President Obama about Supreme Court appointments.339 The
purpose of his letter, Professor Tribe wrote, was to urge the President to
"move the Court in a pragmatically progressive direction."340 The new
Justice, like the retiring David Souter, should have the capacity to prevent
341
centrist Anthony Kennedy from drifting to the right on individual rights.
Proposed appointee, Sonia Sotomayor, Tribe feared, would lack Souter's
"purchase on Tony Kennedy's mind," and solidify the conservative wing of
the Court.342 By contrast, he argued, Elena Kagan's "combination of
intellectual brilliance and political skill" would make her "a more
formidable match for Justice Scalia."343
Professor Tribe's letter exemplifies the prevailing political approach to
choosing Supreme Court nominees.3" The appointment power, far from
constraining the Court's operation as a legislative body, magnifies that
propensity. Rather than attacking the practice of judicial law making,
Presidents simply seek to have it work in their favor.
Nation reported on July 28, 1881 that Justice Nathan Clifford, though declining mentally,
refused to resign "in the hope that the election of a Democratic President might render
certain the appointment of a Democratic successor." WARREN, supra note 1, at 345 n.2.
339. Ed Whelan, Tribe to Obama: Sotomayor Is "Not Nearly As Smart As She Seems To
Think She Is," NAT'L REv. ONLINE (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.nationalreview.com/benchmemos/251301/tribe-obama-sotomayor-not-nearly-smart-she-seems-think-she-ed-whelan.
340. Letter from Laurence H. Tribe to President Barack Obama, at 1 (May 4, 2009),
available at http://www.eppc.org/docLib/20101028_tribeletter.pdf (last visited Mar. 1,2012).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 1-2.
344. President Obama, of course, though choosing Judge Sotomayor as his first
appointment, made Elena Kagan his next.
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B. Impeachment: the Power of Removal
The impeachment power is not plenary but limited to "Treason, Bribery,
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.""' Does this power permit
removal of Supreme Court Justices who read unenumerated rights into the
Constitution, striking otherwise valid state or federal laws? Or can this
authority only reach actual violations of criminal law by particular justices?
The Constitution clearly distinguishes between conviction for crime and
removal from office.346 Thus, an accusation of criminality is not a
prerequisite to impeachment.347 Noting that the purpose of impeachment is
not to secure a criminal conviction against an individual, but rather to
prevent the further exercise of official power, Justice Joseph Story
commented: "[A]n impeachment is a proceeding purely of a political
nature. It is not so much designed to punish an offender, as to secure the
state against gross official misdemeanors. It touches neither his person, nor
his property; but simply divests him of his political capacity.""" Hamilton's
survey of the subject further indicates that the purpose of impeachment is
to protect the community against official misconduct, not merely to act as
an adjunct to the condemnation of formal criminality.
The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed
from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the
abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature
which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL,

345. "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 4.
346. "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from
Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the
United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment,
Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
347. "Indeed, it appears to be all but universally agreed that an offense need not be a
violation of criminal law at all in order for it to be impeachable as a high crime or
misdemeanor." Laurence H. Tribe, Defining "High Crimes and Misdemeanors": Basic
Principles, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 712, 717 (1999). See also 116 Cong. Rec. 11,913 (1970)
(statement of Rep. Gerald Ford) (noting the "common misconception[]" that federal judges
"can be removed only by being convicted ... of violating the law").
348. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 801
(1833), available at http://www.constitution.org/js/js_310.htm.
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as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society
itself...
The purpose of impeachment is to allow the people as a whole through their
representatives to address misconduct that affects the national welfare.
"What," Hamilton asks, "is the true spirit of the institution itself? Is it not
designed as a method of NATIONAL INQUEST into the conduct of public
men?"350 Thus, the "inquisitors for the nation" should be "the
representatives of the nation themselves."3 s'
Because the goal of impeachment is to protect the community from
misuse of power that "endangers the Republic,"352 its function rises far
above "the ouster of dreary little judges for squalid misconduct." 35 3
Nonetheless, if the criminal law does not delimit the impeachment power, is
Congress constrained only by its own sense of propriety or the ultimate
sanction of the ballot box in preferring and hearing charges? Because the
Senate has "the sole Power to try all Impeachments," 354 the Supreme Court
does not review its judgments."' In 1970, after the Senate rejected two of
President Nixon's Supreme Court nominees, Congressman Gerald Ford, as
a counterpoint, introduced a resolution of impeachment against Justice
William 0. Douglas. Questioned as to the grounds for the resolution, he
claimed plenary power: "[A]n impeachable offense is whatever a majority of
the House of Representatives considers [it] to be at a given moment in

history[.]"35 6

The delegates to the Constitutional Convention wrestled with this issue.
Some thought Congress should have no power at all to impeach;3 11 others
that the power should be vague and capacious. 35 8 George Mason
recommended adding the word "maladministration" to treason and bribery
349. THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton). See 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES 113 ("acts of
great injury to the community") (statement of James Iredell).
350. THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
351. Id.
352. Tribe, supra note 347, at 713.
353. RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 3 (1973).

354. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
355. "The commonsense meaning of the word 'sole' is that the Senate alone shall have
authority to determine whether an individual should be acquitted or convicted." Nixon v.
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 231 (1993).
356. 116 CONG. REc. 11,913 (1970).
357. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina. 2 RECORDS, supra note 18, at 66 (stating that he
"did not see the necessity of impeachments").
358. Edmund Randolph of Virginia. "Guilt wherever found ought to be punished." Id. at
67.
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to broaden the definition of impeachment. "Treason as defined in the
Constitution will not reach many great and dangerous offences," he stated.
"Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be Treason as above
defined."35 9 James Madison countered that "maladministration" was too
broad. "So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the
Senate," he said. 60 Mason then withdrew his motion to add
"maladministration" and substituted instead "high crimes and
misdemeanors." 6 ' The revised motion passed 8-3.362
The term "high crimes and misdemeanors," narrower than
"maladministration," is of English origin, designating "offenses of a public
nature, which may affect the nation." 6' The term "high" refers not to the
nature or degree of the crime, but to the grave effect upon the public of
misconduct in high places, known generically as political crime.3" Thus,
"high crimes and misdemeanors" are offenses against the body politic,
crimes only made possible by the occupation of high office. They violate the
public trust and oath of office, just as adultery violates a marriage covenant.
"For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required: and
to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more."365 The
impeachment power remedies great public scandal, for which other
correction or redress is unavailable.36 Implicating faithlessness and
corruption of the public trust, such offenses are far more serious than mere
policy disagreements. 3 6 This "superiour [sic] power, acting for the whole

359. Id. at 550. "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort." U.S. CONsT.
art. III, § 3.
360. 3 RECORDS, supra note 18, at 550.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. BERGER, supra note 353, at 60, 62 (quoting 16 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS (1809-1826))
(statement of Serjeant Pengelly during the impeachment of Lord Chancellor Macclesfield in
1725).
364. Id. at 62.
365. Luke 12:48.
366. "[T]he power of impeachment will probably be applied ... where the remedy would
otherwise be wholly inadequate, and the grievance be incapable of redress." 2 STORY, supra
note 348, § 744.
367. The Constitutional Convention rejected a proposal for removal of judges by
majority vote of Congress as undermining the independence of the judiciary. 2 RECORDS,
supra note 18, at 428-29. "The Judges would be in a bad situation if made to depend on every
gust of faction which might prevail in the two branches of our Government." Id. (statement
of James Wilson). Removal thus required a finding of serious culpability.
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people," explained Justice Story, "is put into operation to protect their
rights, and to rescue their liberties from violation."168
Although the impeachment power is unreviewable,36 9 Gerald Ford's
statement that its exercise is completely discretionary overlooks the grave
misconduct the Founders contemplated for the prosecution of such
proceedings. The Constitution limits congressional authority to impeach to
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."37 0 The latter
phrase, which Congressman Ford described as "nebulous,"'
clearly
contemplates offenses comparable to treason and bribery.372 When trying a
high official for abuse of trust, Congress should not itself engage in such
abuse.373
Part of the opposition to a broad definition of impeachment as affecting
the Executive arises from the electoral check. On the one hand, the people
are entitled to see the magistrate they elected complete his term.374 On the
other hand, the four-year term of the Presidency operates as a periodic
opportunity for removal.3 " In the case of the judiciary, however, no popular
remedy exists. Is a continual course of judicial usurpation that saps the
foundations of self-government sufficient to qualify as an "abuse or
violation" of the public trust? Hamilton said yes. Impeachment, he wrote
that impeachment provides a "constitutional check" against the "danger of
judiciary encroachments on the legislative authority."37 6 The power of

368. 2 STORY, supra note 348,

§ 749.

369. But see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253-54 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring)
(arguing that frivolous Senate action "might be so far beyond the scope of its constitutional
authority, and the consequent impact on the Republic so great, as to merit a judicial response
despite the prudential concerns that would ordinarily counsel silence").
370. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 4.
371. 116 CONG. REc. 11,913 (1970).
372. Under the maxim of noscitura sociis, a word is known by the company it keeps. See
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (employing the maxim "to avoid ascribing
to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words. . . .");
BERGER, supra note 353, at 62 (reasoning that because treason and bribery are political
crimes, so are "high crimes and misdemeanors").
373. "If there are indeed 'limits' to the impeachment power, the Senate may no more act
in excess of those limits when it acts 'judicially' than when it acts 'legislatively."' BERGER,
supra note 353, at 300.
374. Removal of the President by impeachment "cancels the results of the most solemn
collective act of which we as a constitutional democracy are capable: the national election of
a President." Tribe, supra note 347, at 723.
375. "An election of every four years will prevent maladministration." 3 RECORDs, supra
note 18, at 550 (statement of Gouverneur Morris).
376. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
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"punishing their presumption, by degrading them from their stations," he
argued, would deter the justices from "a series of deliberate usurpations"
that hazarded "the united resentment" of the legislators." Reflecting on
English history, Justice Story noted that judges had been impeached "for
attempts to subvert the fundamental laws, and introduce arbitrary
power.""' Justice Frankfurter noted that the only appeal from decisions of
the Court is "impeachment or constitutional amendment.""'
Lawyers as a profession tend to resist impeachment as an attack on their
own professional habitat.3"o Chief Justice Rehnquist described impeachment
as a threat to "separation of powers,"" even though Hamilton considered it
essential to the preservation of the legislative power from judicial
encroachment.3 82 Calling the impeachment power "a complete security"
against judicial overreaching, Hamilton argued that the deterrence affords
"a cogent argument for constituting the Senate a court for the trial of
impeachments."383
The Framers designed impeachment as the sole means of removing
Supreme Court justices." After the Senate acquitted Samuel Chase,
Thomas Jefferson stated: "[E]xperience has already shown that the
impeachment [the Constitution] has provided is not even a scarecrow. "385
Though not since employed against a sitting Supreme Court justice,
impeachment remains a formidable means of disciplining the Court.3 86 The
377. Id.
378. 2 STORY, supra note 348, § 798. "The model, from which the national court of
impeachments is borrowed, is, doubtless, that of Great Britain ..... Id. § 742.
379. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
380. See Steven W. Fitschen, ImpeachingFederalJudges: A Covenantaland Constitutional
Response to Judicial Tyranny, 10 REGENT U. L. REv. 111, 113-17 (1998) (detailing massing of
state and national bar associations and law school deans against impeachment rumblings in
the wake of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (overturning Colorado constitutional
amendment that disallowed preferred legal status for homosexuals)).
381. William H. Rehnquist, The Impeachment Clause: A Wild Card in the Constitution,
85 Nw. UNIV. L.REV. 903, 918 (1991).
382. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
383. Id.
384. See THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The precautions for their

responsibility, are comprised in the article respecting impeachments. . . . This is the only
provision on the point .... ).
385. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 12 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 51, at 137.

386. In 1953, the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on impeachment of Justice
Douglas after he stayed the execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. When the full court
overruled the stay, the impeachment resolution was tabled. See Fitschen, supra note 380, at
138.
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procedural requirement of a House majority. and two-thirds assent in the
Senate,... however, makes impeachment for political causes unlikely. Even
strongly partisan swings in congressional elections rarely achieve a 60%
majority for the dominant party in one house, let alone both. Furthermore,
a majority of the justices are unlikely to issue a decision so alienating as to
consolidate a two-thirds vote for removal against them individually or
collectively."'
Although the Court's decisions often produce outrage from one side of
the divide, they simultaneously draw admiration from the other. Where the
soul of the nation is divided, mustering a two-thirds majority to oust judges
for ideological reasons seems remote. 90 The judicial imposition of sodomite
marriage on the nation, however, could change this calculus, especially if it
provoked an electoral landslide.39 ' A new justice could tip the balance,
resulting in a reversal of the offending decision. Alternatively, the pendency
of an impeachment trial might inspire the contemporary equivalent of the
1937 "switch in time." 392

387. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
388. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.

389. See, for example, PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869-73 (1992), where
the court, though considering itself called to resolve the abortion debate through "a common
mandate rooted in the Constitution," id. at 867, provided something to each side: it upheld
Roe's central ruling, but dismantled the regulation-limiting trimester framework. See also
Anita L. Allen, Autonomy's Magic Wand: Abortion and ConstitutionalInterpretation,72 B.U.
L. REV. 683, 698 (1992) (arguing that the Court deftly compromised the abortion issue in
Casey, deliberately giving something to both sides).
390. If the President were of the opposite party to the congressional majorities,
impeachment could be ineffectual. The replacement nominee might be similar in values to
the ousted justice. However, the message sent to the Court would be unmistakable, especially
if more than one justice were removed simultaneously. See A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa
Judges
Sends
Signal
to
Bench,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
3,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html?pagewanted=all (discussing
"[a]n unprecedented vote to remove three Iowa Supreme Court justices").
391. Roe uprooted laws protecting the sanctity of life that dated from the nineteenth
century, but had been eroded by degenerating sexual mores. By contrast, thirty state
constitutions contain amendments, all passed since 1997, prohibiting same-sex marriage.
List of State ConstitutionalAmendments Banning Same-Sex Unions by Type, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of defenseof marriage.amendments to_U.S._state_cons
titutions_bytype (last visited Mar. 19, 2011).
392. See MURPHY, supra note 304; see also id. at 246 (describing the Court's moderation
of its race relations and cold war decisions in the late 1950s as a "tactical withdrawal" in the
face of Congressional resistance).
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C. The Exceptions Clause
The Exceptions Clause 93 arguably grants Congress power to withdraw
completely the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, reducing its
power to the small set of original jurisdiction cases. 94 Under such an
arrangement, the Supreme Court would be a specialized trial court whose
decisions were not subject to appeal. Cases "affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls" are rare. Those involving a state, under the
Eleventh Amendment3 95 and principles of sovereign immunity,3 96 would
probably be limited to boundary and water rights disputes. No jurisdiction
at all would exist over general federal legislation. Constitutional litigation
would occur only in state court under the Supremacy Clause;' 9 the Arising
Clause3 98 would be a virtual nullity. The result would be the system Madison
and Hamilton decried; only instead of a thirteen-headed hydra, 99 the
monster would have fifty heads. 00 Constitutional law would develop
independently in each state. Alternatively, under Article III, § 1, Congress
could abolish all lower federal courts, or strip their jurisdiction over
constitutional issues.
In the 1960s and 1970s, two bills to strip the federal courts of original
and appellate jurisdiction over particular subject matter areas passed one
house of Congress, but went no further. The House, responding to Reynolds
v. Sims,401 passed a bill in 1964 to eliminate federal court jurisdiction over
state legislative apportionment. The Tuck Bill failed in the Senate.402 Seeking
393. "[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
394. Id. ("In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.").
395. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
396. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
397. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
398. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
399. See supra text accompanying note 17.
400. See supra text accompanying notes 18-47.
401. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (requiring apportionment by population in
both houses of all state legislatures). James McClellan, CongressionalRetraction of Federal
Court Jurisdiction to Protect the Reserved Powers of the States: The Helms PrayerBill and a
Return to First Principles,27 VILL. L.REv. 1019, 1019 (1982). See also Tara Leigh Grove, The
Structural Safeguards of FederalJurisdiction,124 HARV. L. REv. 869, 901 n.177, para. 3 (2011)
(discussing history of Tuck Bill).
402. McClellan, supra note 401, at 1019.
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to nullify Engel v. Vitale,40 the Senate passed a bill in 1979 stripping federal
courts of jurisdiction over state laws on voluntary prayer in public schools.
The Helms Prayer Bill died in committee in the House.404 Similarly, in 1982,
the Senate passed a bill to deny federal courts power to order school busing,
but the House did not concur.405 Though escaping an Exceptions Clause
rebuke, the justices were keenly aware that reckless offense to public
opinion could threaten an assault on their jurisdiction. "[Chief Justice Earl]
Warren," wrote Justice Brennan's authorized biographer, "realized the
Court had to pick and choose the areas in which it would run ahead of
public opinion if it was to stave off congressional threats to prune its
jurisdiction."40 6 When Brennan sought to appoint a clerk who had led a
contingent to the 1962 Communist youth festival in Helsinki, and had
written for the People's World, the Party's West Coast paper, public reaction
was sharp. Interviewing the candidate, Brennan reminded him that threats
to strip the Court of jurisdiction "remained real." He ultimately rescinded
the appointment.40 7
Two decades later, still mindful of the episode, Justice Brennan explained
to an interviewer that the threat of a congressional investigation, conveyed
by the FBI through Justice Abe Fortas, caused him to rethink the
appointment.40 8 He remembered in particular a serious jurisdictionstripping bill introduced in the Senate in 1958 in response to Court
opinions on subversion.
Remember, a little before this happened, the Senate came very
close to passing the Jenner Bill, which would have stripped the
Court of jurisdiction over cases involving the powers of
congressional investigations, loyalty rules for teachers and

403. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
404. McClellan, supra note 401, at 1019-20.
405. Grove, supra note 401, at 907-09. In 2004, the House passed a bill withdrawing
federal jurisdiction over the Defense of Marriage Act. See Marriage Protection Act of 2004,
H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives, July 22, 2004); Grove, supra,
at 915. In 2004 and 2006, the House passed bills withdrawing federal jurisdiction from cases
about the Pledge of Allegiance. See Pledge Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. (as
passed by House of Representatives, Sept. 23, 2004); Pledge Protection Act of 2005, H.R.
2389, 109th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives, July 19, 2006); Grove, supra, at
911-15.
406. STERN &WERMIEL, supra note 211, at 257.
407. Id. at 264-70; see also MICHAEL E. TIGAR, FIGHTING INJUSTICE 52-59 (2002); EISLER,

supra note 225, at 198-201.
408. Hentoff, supranote 236, at 61-62.
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The Court has at times indicated that jurisdiction-stripping laws would
be valid,410 but, if directly challenged, would probably read the Exceptions
Clause narrowly to avoid nullifying the Arising Clause and the Vesting
Clause."' The Court's willingness to assert supreme authority to construe
the Constitution in Fourteenth Amendment enforcement cases 412 indicates
that it would resist such an attack on its prerogatives. 413 However, like
409. Id. at 62. For the history of the Jenner Bill, see MURPHY, supra note 304, at 154-83,
207-08.
410. See, e.g., ExparteMcCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
411. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court....").
412. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
413. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (describing the "responsibility of this
Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution"); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958)
(stating as "a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system" that "the
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution . . . ."). For
academic commentary on the scope of the Exceptions Clause, see Paul M. Bator,
CongressionalPower over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1981)
(arguing for a broad and plenary reading of congressional power to define the Court's
jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause); Raoul Berger, Commentary, Congressional
Contraction of Federal Jurisdiction, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 801 (1980) (welcoming use of the
Exceptions Clause to reign in a runaway Court, and also emphasizing congressional power
under section 5 to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); Joseph Blocher, Amending the
Exceptions Clause, 92 MINN. L. REV. 971 (2008) (discussing the scope of the Exceptions
Clause and its use as a substitute for amendment); Morris D. Forkosch, The Exceptions and
Regulations Clause of Article III and a Person's Constitutional Rights: Can the Latter be
Limited by CongressionalPower under the Former?, 72 W. VA. L. REV. 238 (1970) (arguing
that the Exceptions Clause cannot eliminate judicial review or trench upon individual
rights); Alex Glashausser, A Return to Form for the Exceptions Clause, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1383
(2010) (arguing that the 1787 Constitutional Convention did not intend the Exceptions
Clause to limit the power of judicial review); Gerald Gunther, CongressionalPower to Curtail
Federal Court Jurisdiction:An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV.
895 (1984) (Congress has power under the Exceptions Clause to limit certain issues to state
court consideration.); James J.Lenoir, CongressionalControl over the Appellate Jurisdiction
of
the Supreme Court, 5 U. KAN. L. REv. 16 (1956) (examining the Exceptions Clause in light of
precedent, and finding that Congress has control of the Court's appellate jurisdiction within
limits); Charles E. Rice, Congress and the Supreme Court's Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 959
(1982) (recommending use of Exceptions Clause to curb unconstitutional Court decisions);
Harrison Tweed, Provisions of the Constitution Concerning the Supreme Court of the United
States, 31 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1951) (arguing for a constitutional amendment to confirm the
power of judicial review in the Supreme Court, and thus eliminate the Exceptions Clause as
an alternative to Article V); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte
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Brennan's retrenchment in the Tigar matter, the Court is likely to tack
closer to public opinion long before such legislation ripens.4 14 Actual use of
the Exceptions Clause to remove piecemeal the Court's jurisdiction over
hot-button issues creates the possibility of potential reversal and
whipsawing by changing political majorities."' Faced with such furious
political winds, however, the Court historically has relented, as the
sensitivity expressed by Justices Warren and Brennan indicates.
D. An OverrideAmendment: CongressionalReview of Supreme Court
Decisions
From time to time, opponents of judicial review, or the abuse thereof,
have argued that the assumption of legislative powers by the Court requires
by constitutional amendment4 16 an assumption of judicial power by

McCardle, 15 ARiz. L. REv. 229 (1973) (stating that the Exceptions Clause, though a broad
power, may be inexpedient to utilize in a major way).
414. To protect the Court from a recurrence of the 1937 court-packing experience, the
American Bar Association after World War II proposed a constitutional amendment fixing
the size of the Court at nine, requiring mandatory retirement at seventy-five, and eliminating
the Exceptions Clause for cases arising under the Constitution. See Supreme Court of the
U.S.: Amendments of the ConstitutionAre Proposed,34 A.B.A. J. 1, 1 (1948) (recommending
amendment of Article III, Section 2 to add the following: "In all Cases arising under this
Constitution the supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to Law and Fact.").
See generally David Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical
Casefor a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 995, 1028-43 (2000) (describing in detail the
rise and demise of the ABA amendment).
The growing support for an Amendment to protect the Court's jurisdiction over
constitutional issues collapsed after the 1954 desegregation decision and opinions that
appeared to protect communists. Conservative legislators, in the wake of Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and the subversion opinions, wanted to retain as much
leverage over the Court as possible. See Garrow, supra, at 1041-43 (noting that "what most
fundamentally altered congressional sentiment concerning the Court was not its
desegregation holdings but the series of decisions negating various anti-Communism
measures and investigations").
415. "If this game of 'exceptions,' as an instrument of party warfare, be once fairly
entered on," wrote the Nation in early 1868, "we venture to say that, in the course of the next
twenty years, the constitutionality of half the statutes at large would be withdrawn from the
cognizance of the Supreme Court." WARREN, supra note 1,at 193.
416. Without a constitutional amendment, legislative review of final judgments would
violate separation of powers. The Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States
in the federal courts. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S.
211 (1995) (Congress may not reopen final judgments by statute.).
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Congress to correct the situation."' During the impeachment of Samuel
Chase, despairing of maintaining the independence of the Court, Chief
Justice John Marshall suggested such an expedient: "I think the modern
doctrine of impeachment should yield to an appellate jurisdiction in the
legislature. A reversal of those legal opinions deemed unsound by the
legislature certainly would better comport with the mildness of our
character than the removal of the judge, who has rendered them.""'
Marshall's argument has great appeal. First, the judicial authority of the
Court over all cases and controversies arising under the Constitution would
remain undisturbed. Second, the remedy is structural rather than
piecemeal. Third, Congress would finally have the means to control the
unconstitutional assumption of legislative power by the judiciary.
A congressional override amendment, by supermajority or otherwise,"'
would make Congress the final court of appeal. Lodging judicial authority
in the legislature is not without precedent. Historically, the House of Lords,
the second branch of Parliament, has performed this function.420 Congress
would not have appellate authority over all cases, but only those in which
the Supreme Court declared federal or state law unconstitutional. Managing
this small, but significant, docket would not tax the institution or
significantly delay the administration of justice. An additional delay in cases
where the Court declared a law unconstitutional would be warranted by the
417. The Founders conceded that separation of powers does not require an airtight
division of functions. The presidential veto, for instance, is an executive exercise of legislative
power. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cls. 2 & 3.
418. Letter from John Marshall to Samuel Chase (Jan. 13, 1804), in 3 ALBERT J.
BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 177-78 (1919). Some colonial legislatures had power
to override judicial decisions, primarily by vacating a judgment and ordering a new trial. See
Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219 ("In the 17th and 18th centuries colonial assemblies and legislatures
functioned as courts of equity of last resort, hearing original actions or providing appellate
review of judicial judgments."); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398 (1798) (opinion of
Iredell, J.) (noting that the Connecticut legislature "has been in the uniform, uninterrupted,
habit of exercising a general superintending power over its courts of law, by granting new
trials.").
419. Texas Governor Rick Perry proposed enacting a legislative override by a two-thirds
vote in both houses, "which risks increased politicization of judicial decisions, but also has
the benefit of letting the people stop the Court from unilaterally deciding policy." RICK
PERRY, FED UP! OUR FIGHT TO SAVE AMERICA FROM WASHINGTON 183 (2010). Alexander
Hamilton feared that lodging final judicial power in the legislature could allow "the
pestilential breath of faction [to] poison the fountains of justice." THE FEDERALIST No. 81
(Alexander Hamilton).
420. Canada's Bill of Rights has a legislative override provision. See Jeffrey Goldsworthy,
JudicialReview, Legislative Override, andDemocracy, 38 WAKE FOREST L.REV. 451 (2003).
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weightiness of the issue. In some ways, congressional review would add to
efficiency. Frequent legislative attempts to modify stricken laws to satisfy
the Court can produce additional years of litigation before a final
resolution.42 1 Just as a presidential veto suspends enactment of a law unless
a two-thirds override can be mustered,4 22 the Override Amendment would
suspend the effect of a Supreme Court case pending an override attempt in
Congress.
Granting Congress power to override a judicial veto would install a
pleasing parallelism in the Constitution, restoring full recognition to the
exclusive grant of legislative power to Congress in Article 1.423 The Supreme
Court's veto would be subject to the same potential for override as a
Presidential veto. Since the Supreme Court is driven more by policy
considerations than by legal constraints, its veto should be subject to
reversal the same as the President's.
Use of this power would be rare. Congress historically has overridden
less than ten percent of presidential vetoes.4 24 Gathering a two-thirds vote in
both houses contrary to the Court on hotly disputed cultural issues would
be an uncommon occurrence, 4 25 especially with the known capacity of the
421. For Congressional attempts to protect children from internet pornography in the
face of First Amendment barriers erected by the Court, see Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656
(2004); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S.
234 (2002); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). The partial-birth abortion ban took a decade
to become law. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914
(2000).
422. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2 & 3.
423. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
representatives."). Rather than reconsidering the offending decision itself, Congress could
simply reinstate the rejected law, taking testimony on its merits as is customary for a
legislative body. The Court would then continue with the case on "remand." See WILUIAM G.
Ross, A MUTED FURY 193-217 (1994) (recounting history of 1920's proposal of Senator
Robert La Follette for amendment to permit Congress conclusively to reinstate invalidated
statutes).
424. See MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-157, CONGRESSIONAL
at
available
(2004),
1
VETOES
PRESIDENTIAL
OF
OVERRIDES

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/98-157.pdf (noting that "Presidents have vetoed
1,484 bills and Congress has overridden only 106 of them"); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr.,

Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991)

(providing a detailed history of Congressional statutory overrides).
425. "[T]aking action against the Court requires a congruence of agreement and action
among the political branches. This will work in all but the most extraordinary circumstances
to immunize the Court." Barry Friedman, The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty,
PartII Reconstruction'sPoliticalCourt, 91 GEO. L.J. 1,5 (2002).
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Court to adapt to political pressure.42 6 The more likely effect of an override
amendment would be to cause the Court to moderate its opinions to avoid

reversal. 427

E. A SupermajorityAmendment
Perhaps the most effective and most elegant amendment would be a
requirement that the Court have a three-fourths majority to find a law
unconstitutional. 4 28 Two state constitutions, Nebraska and North Dakota,
require a judicial supermajority to invalidate legislation. Nebraska requires
five judges to concur out of seven (71.4%);429 North Dakota requires four
out of five (80%).430 The supermajority solution avoids adding another layer
to the appellate process and has its own appealing parallelism. If the Court
is to act as a continuing constitutional convention, then it should be bound
by the supermajority requirements of Article V, namely, ratification by a
three-fourths majority. 431 Requiring a supermajority to invalidate legislation
on constitutional grounds also endorses the principle of presuming
constitutionality in close cases. A federal appellate judge wrote: "When a
426. See supra note 392.
427. See Barry Friedman, The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part One:
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 333 (1998) (finding that the Court has
historically altered its behavior when threatened with majoritarian pressure).
428. Three-fourths of nine is 6.75, thus requiring a minimum 7-2 vote to find a law
unconstitutional. For a survey of judicial supermajority proposals, see Evan Caminker,
Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the
Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73, 88-94 (2003). See also Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist.,
281 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1930) (upholding an Ohio supermajority provision against due process
attack); Lynn I. Perrigo, Proposalsto Restrict JudicialNullification of Statutes, 8 RocKY MTN.
L. REV. 161, 177-79, 185 (1936) (proposing a two-thirds vote for the Court to declare a
statute unconstitutional).
429. "No legislative act shall be held unconstitutional except by the concurrence of five
judges." NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2. See Paul W. Madgett, Comment, The "Five-Judge" Rule in
Nebraska,2 CREIGHTON L.REv. 329, 329 (1969).
430. "[T]he supreme court shall not declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional
unless at least four of the members of the court so decide." N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4. See
Editorial, Supermajority Rule Could Help U.S. Supreme Court, GRAND FORKS HERALD, May
16, 2010, availableat 2010 WLNR 10279205.
431. Amendments "shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution,
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States or by Conventions in
three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress . . . ." U.S. CONsT. art. V. Cf Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule:
Reviving Consensus and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 893-94 (2003)
(suggesting a two-thirds majority rule as "symmetrical and appropriate" to invalidate 5-4
federalism decisions of Rehnquist court).
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constitutional question is so close, when conventional interpretive methods
do not begin to resolve the issue decisively, the tie for many reasons should
4 32
go to the side of deference to democratic processes." Because of the
cultural divide, such a supermajority would rarely, if ever, coalesce to
dramatically change the cultural mores of the country. Although Roe v.
Wade"3 was a 7-2 vote, Chief Justice Burger may well have refused his
assent if his vote had controlled the outcome. More to the point, Roe would
have died in 1992, when more than two justices were willing to overrule
it. 4 34 Likewise, Lawrence v. Texas, embracing sodomy as a constitutional
In general, a Supermajority
value, would not have succeeded.3
law litigation designed to
public
Amendment would massively deter
43 6
overturn the legislative wishes of the majority. The government of the
people would again be government by the people rather than government
by judiciary.4 The other great advantage of a Supermajority Amendment is
that it would place the burden on the Court to gather the supermajority,
438
rather than, under an override amendment, upon Congress.
1. 1868: The Two-Thirds Bill
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the House of Representatives, fearing
439
that the Supreme Court would overturn Reconstruction measures, and
0
desirous of discouraging any future adventures like Dred Scott,44 passed a
bill requiring a two-thirds majority of the Court to find an Act of Congress

432. J.Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the UnravelingRule of Law, 95 VA.
L.REV. 253, 267 (2009).
433. 410 U.S. 413 (1973).
434. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (5-4).
435. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (6-3).
436. Cf Chayes, supra note 194.
437. See generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (2d ed. 1997).
438. For a history of supermajority provisions in the Constitution, see Brett W. King, The
Use of Supermajority Provisions in the Constitution: the Framers, the Federalist Papers and
the Reinforcement of a Fundamental Principle, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 363 (1997). The
supermajority could also arguably be enacted legislatively as a regulation of the Court's
appellate jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl.2.
439. CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 486 (1868) (describing the bill as a proposal "to
muzzle the Supreme Court to the end that that court may not interfere with the will of this
Congress with respect to the reconstruction measures") (statement of Rep. Richard
Hubbard).
440. "I have reasons, very strong reasons, for insisting upon such legislation. I consider
the utterance in the Dred Scott case . . . as furnishing a substantial reason for such
legislation." Id. at 484 (statement of Rep. John Bingham).
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unconstitutional."' A lengthy debate on the bill took place on January 13,
1868.42 Henry Dawes (R-Mass.)"' suggested the Exceptions Clause"' as
authority for the bill."' Beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress
routinely determined the size of the Court."6 The first Court had six
justices, and thus required a two-thirds majority-four of six-to reach a
decision."' "[B]y fixing the number of judges," said John Bingham (ROhio), "we have the whole power ... for what we may do indirectly we may
do directly[.]""4
Representative Spalding argued that Congress could modify the default
majority rule inherited from the common law. "[T]he law-making power
has always had in its hands the power to say whether a mere majority
should be sufficient, or whether two thirds or three fourths or the whole
441. The relevant clause read:
That no cause pending before the Supreme Court of the United States which
involves the action or effect of any law of the United States shall be decided
adversely to the validity of such law without the concurrence of two thirds of all
the members of said court in the decision upon the several points in which said
law or any part thereof may be deemed invalid.
Id. at 478. The bill passed 116-39. Id. at 489.
442. Id. at 478-89.
443. For biographical information on individual representatives, see the BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/
biosearch.asp [hereinafter BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY].
444. "[Tlhe supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
445. "Does not the phrase 'under such regulations' cover the whole case?" CONG. GLOBE,
40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 487 (1868) (statement of Rep. Dawes). After passage, the bill sponsor,
Representative Williams, accepted a recommendation to add "and to regulate the
jurisdiction thereof" to the title. Id. at 489.
446. The Constitution, stated Rufus Spalding (R-Ohio), "does not fix the number of
judges which shall constitute the Supreme Court; hence the number has at times been
increased by Congress and again diminished at its pleasure." Id. at 482.
447. The Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. XX, § 1, 1 Stat. 73 ("That the supreme court of the
United States shall consist of a chief justice and five associate justices, any four of whom shall
be a quorum .... ).
448. CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 487 (1868). By reducing the Court to three
Justices, Bingham argued, Congress could similarly force a two-thirds rule for decision. Id. at
483. "Ifin 1789 they could make that court consist of six judges, who is here to say we cannot
make it consist of three?" Id. at 484. By reducing it to two, unanimity would be required. Id.
at 483. "And if by law you may so organize this court that there must be unanimity may you
not by law establish the two thirds rule ... ?"Id. Congress had also previously established the
size of a quorum of the Court: four out of six in 1789; five out of eight in 1837. Id. at 482
(statement of John Pruyn).
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number of judges should be required to render a decision."" 9 He explained
that for "everything except its official life that tribunal must look to an act of
Congress. Without the authority of an act of Congress it could have no
clerks, it could have no power to administer oaths.""so Congress can grant a
smaller degree of jurisdiction to the Court than the Constitution authorizes,
he argued, citing the jurisdictional minimum for diversity suits as an
example."' "If Congress can adopt such a provision as that," Spalding said,
"it certainly can say that in a decision upon a high constitutional question
the concurrence of a certain number of judges more than a bare majority
shall be necessary."5 Spalding also noted "the analogy existing in the

Constitution itself."4 53
Sir, I contend that the same process of reasoning which would
show a public utility in requiring two thirds of the Senate and
House of Representatives to enact a law over the opinion of the
President of the United States requires two thirds of the Supreme
Court to reverse our action on the ground of its

unconstitutionality. 4 54
To support the supermajority proposal, representatives also cited the
"clear case" rule. Thomas Williams (R-Penn.) noted "that it is a well-settled
principle that no act of the law-making power should ever be declared
invalid upon constitutional grounds unless it be a clear case." 55 Arguing for
a stringent rule of unanimity, he stated: "Now, I hold that wherever, with a
bench composed of eight judges, 5 6 there is one dissenting member, the case
is to be regarded as by no means a clear one."4 57 Mr. Wilson from Indiana

449. Id. at 482 (statement of Rufus Spalding). George Boutwell (R-Mass.) asked: "[Ils it
not entirely competent for the legislative authority to change the common law if there be no
specific inhibition in the Constitution?" Id. at 485.
450. Id. at 482.
451. Id. at 482-83.
452. Id. at 483.
453. Id. at 481.
454. Id. Spalding, a Yale graduate and an attorney, served in the Ohio House of
Representatives (1839-1842), was an associate justice of the Oho Supreme Court (18491852), and served three terms in Congress (1863-1869). See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S00697.
455. CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 479 (1868).
456. In 1868, the Supreme Court consisted of eight Justices. Id. at 481. "A short time ago
it consisted of ten; then nine; and now eight." Id. (statement of Rufus Spalding).
457. Id. at 479. Williams' proposal to require a unanimous vote to declare an Act of
Congress unconstitutional failed by a vote of 25-124. Id. at 489.
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concurred. "[T]hat you have a divided court proves of itself that the
question before it is in doubt[.]""
His unanimity proposal, Mr. Williams argued, drew strength from the
propensity of the Supreme Court to usurp the legislative power.
A majority of the Committee on the Judiciary think that two
thirds are enough. I think that where eight men claim the power
of legislating by construction by ruling what the Constitution of
the United States is and what it is not, we may well require the
concurrent voices of all these men when they are expected to
overthrow the decision of perhaps one hundred and sixty lawyers
of the two Houses of Congress."'
James Wilson (R-Iowa), sponsor of the two-thirds-measure, approved in
principle, but felt that less than unanimity was "the better rule.""o He
agreed with Mr. Williams that the Supreme Court exercised legislative
power.
We are simply declaring that the Supreme Court of the United
States shall not have legislative power without the concurrence at
least of two thirds of its members. That body makes law when it
decides a case.

. .

. And it is not merely a legislative rule but an

organic rule which is established by the Supreme Court by the
decisions which it utters[.]. 6
In light of the "gigantic, crushing power" of the Court, Wilson concluded,
imposition of a two-thirds rule before declaring a law unconstitutional was
not an excessive exercise of Congressional power.4 62
After passing the House on January 13, 1868, the bill went to the Senate.
Charles Sumner (R-Mass.) stated: "I do not think it is reasonable that a bare

458. Id. at 488. Mr. Wilson's state designation may be a misnomer. The correct
identification is probably of James Wilson of Iowa, the sponsor of the bill. Indiana did not
have a representative named Wilson in the 40th Congress. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=W000594.
459. CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 478 (1868).
460. Id. at 488.
461. Id.
462. Id. Mr. Spalding noted that the two-thirds rule, in the event of a divided court,
would prevent the power of decision from resting in the hand of one man. "It is not to be
made by a single voice when the court consists of seven, three on one side and three on the
other, and one man turns the scale. But it requires the united opinion of two thirds of all the
members of the Supreme Court... ."Id. at 482.
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majority of any court should declare an act of Congress unconstitutional."4 6 3
Commenting on referral of the bill to the Senate Judiciary Committee, he
added: "I hope they will consider whether they should not go further and
require something more than a two-thirds vote of the Supreme Court in
order to set aside an act of Congress; consider whether they should not
require a three-fourths vote, a four-fifths vote, possibly a unanimous
vote."4" Ultimately, the Senate did not act."
Since 1789, Congress has determined the number of Justices on the
Supreme Court4 66 and how many shall constitute a quorum. By the same
logic, Congress should also be able to determine the number of Justices
necessary to form a majority in constitutional cases. However, to institute
such a powerful reform by statute makes the reform vulnerable to reversal
by statute. Thus, a constitutional amendment is a more stable solution.
Additionally, if the Supreme Court were to find a supermajority statute
unconstitutional by a 7-2 vote, they could defeat the statute while ostensibly
complying with it." 7 In that event, Congress could impeach, but the
sounder approach is by amendment.
2. The "Clear Case" Rule
As Representatives Williams and Wilson stated,"* the two-thirds bill is
really a restoration of the "clear case" rule. Chief Justice Morrison Waite
explained:
[A] declaration [that an act of Congress is void] should never be
made except in a clear case. Every possible presumption is in
favor of the validity of a statute, and this continues until the
contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt.
The safety of our institutions depends in no small degree on a
strict observance of this salutary rule."'
463.

CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 504 (1868).

464. Id.
465. See WARREN, supra note 1, at 193. In 1923, Senator William Borah (R-Idaho)
introduced a bill requiring seven members of the Court to concur before finding an Act of
Congress unconstitutional. See WARREN, supra note 54, at 179.
466. See CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 2127 (1868) (speech of Sen. Buckalew

reciting the laws of 1837, 1863, and 1866 changing the size of the Court).
467. Responding to the passage of the two-thirds bill in the House, the Springfield
Republican raised the question: "Ifthe Supreme Court should decide the two-thirds law to be
unconstitutional, and by a two-thirds vote, what is to be done next?" WARREN, supra note 1,
at 192.
468. See supra text accompanying notes 455-58.
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The Supreme Court, in Hamilton's words, may only invalidate a law when it
is "contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution.""o "Manifest,"
meaning clear, obvious, and undisputed, is comparable to the legal concept
of "clear error," which Black's Law Dictionary defines as "unquestionably
erroneous."4 71 The Court may act, but only in clear cases. When the Court is
divided 5-4 on a hotly contested issue, the very division of opinion is
evidence that whatever error is at issue is not clear. When the Court is
unanimous, by contrast, one can say that the error is so clear that all agree
as to its presence. In close votes, however, the error is manifestly unclear,
and thus, not sufficient to warrant voiding the law.
As demonstrated above, 7 2 the Founders contemplated judicial review.
But the judicial review they anticipated was limited to laws that "manifestly"
violated the written text of the Constitution, and did not include those that
the Justices merely considered unwise. Substituting the Justices' personal
legislative views for the will of Congress is an unconstitutional act. Yet that
is what the Court habitually does.
Hamilton further stated that the Court may invalidate a statute only in
case of an "irreconcilable variance."473 Again, in cases of doubt, a law should
be affirmed. How can a statute be unquestionably erroneous, irreconcilably
at variance with the Constitution, and manifestly contrary to its tenor when
the judges appointed to discern this variance cannot agree among
themselves on the fact? The very division on the Court is substantial
evidence that the statute is reasonably compatible with the Constitution,
and thus valid.
Hamilton gave an example of constitutional prohibitions the courts may
police. "By a limited Constitution," he wrote, "I understand one which
contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for
instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex postfacto laws, and
the like."' He referred to specific defined prohibitions. Justice Marshall,
469. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1879). See similarly Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S.
509, 515 (1899) (The Court should hold an Act of Congress unconstitutional "only when the
question is free from any reasonable doubt."); Robert Eugene Cushman, Constitutional
Decisions by a Bare Majority of the Court, 19 MICH. L. REv. 771, 776 (1921) (noting the
ubiquity of the reasonable doubt rule as "the only correct and orthodox rule of judicial
construction").
470. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
471. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
472. See supra § II.
473. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
474. Id.
475. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9.

670

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:597

in Marbury v. Madison, used the same example.116 One scholar notes:
"Marshall chose hypothetical statutes that no reasonable person could
believe were constitutional .

.

. evincing his commitment to the prevalent

understanding that judicial review authorized invalidation of only obviously
unconstitutional laws."4 77 These instances do not imply a carte blanche
power to overrule the legislature to further the Court's collective vision of
justice. They represent, as Senator Charles Drake (R-Mo.) stated in 1869, a
power to reverse only "plain, palpable, and self-evident violation of the
Constitution."" As Lino Graglia writes, "the Constitution is a very short
document that wisely precludes very few policy choices; .

.

. examples of

clearly unconstitutional laws are difficult to find.""' And yet Supreme
Court rulings of unconstitutionality rarely invoke specific prohibitions, but
instead resort to generic glosses like "reasonable expectation of privacy"480
to avoid the specific words of the document and create broad rubrics for the
exercise of unfettered judicial legislation.
Hamilton's limiting conditions on judicial review find an echo in early
Supreme Court decisions. The Justices very cautiously contemplated the
exercise of this awful power. "[A]s the authority to declare [a law] void is of
a delicate and awful nature," wrote Justice James Iredell, "the Court will
never resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case.""' The
converse of the clear case is the doubtful case. "The deliberate decision of
the National Legislature," wrote Justice Samuel Chase "would determine
me, if the case was doubtful, to receive the construction of the
48 3
Legislature."482 In Ogden v. Saunders,
Justice Bushrod Washington
476. "The constitution declares 'that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be
passed.' If, however, such a bill should be passed, and a person should be prosecuted under
it; must the court condemn to death those victims whom the constitution endeavours to
preserve?" 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
477. Michael J.Klarman, How Great Were the "Great"MarshallCourt Decisions?,87 VA.
L. REv. 1111, 1121 (2001). In a later case, Marshall offered a somewhat less stringent
standard, closer to clear and convincing: "The opposition between the Constitution and the
law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility
with each other." Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810).
478. CONG. GLOBE,41STCONG.,2D SESS. 89(1869).
479. Graglia, supra note 296, at 1422 & n.9.
480. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (construing
the Fourth Amendment).
481. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J.) (emphasis added); see id. at
395 (Chase, J.) ("I will not decide any law to be void, but in a very dear case.").
482. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 173 (1796) (Chase, J.); see also Trs. of
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 625 (1819) (declaring that "in no
doubtful case, would [the Court] pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the

2012]

TAMING THE SUPREME COURT

671

considered his "difficulty and doubt" about a statute to be "a satisfactory
vindication of it," presuming its validity until violation of the Constitution
"is proved beyond all reasonable doubt." " The Chief Justice of
Pennsylvania in 1811 also used a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
For weighty reasons, it has been assumed as a principle in
constitutional construction by the Supreme Court of the United
States, by this court, and every other court of reputation in the
United States, that an Act of the legislature is not to be declared
void, unless the violation of the constitution is so manifest as to
leave no roomfor reasonabledoubt."'
Warning that courts "must not step into the shoes of the law-maker," James
Bradley Thayer explained that judges do not apply to the legislature "their
own opinion of the true construction of the constitution."" 6 They merely
determine whether the statute is "unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt.""

3. The Jury Analogy
The most venerable supermajority institution in American law is the trial
jury."' Most commonly composed of twelve members,'" juries typically
follow a rule of unanimity.o Reviewing a state law that permitted less than
unanimous verdicts, the Court decided that criminal conviction by nine
votes out of twelve satisfied the reasonable doubt standard"' as "a

constitution"); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 19 (1800) (Paterson, J.) ("[T]o authorise
this Court to pronounce any law void, it must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication."). See generally, Taylor, supra
note 337, at 916-920; Barkow, supra note 146, at 246-51.
483. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827).
484. Id. at 270.
485. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 140 (1893) (emphasis added), quoted in Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 354 n.12 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
486. Thayer, supra note 485, at 151.
487. Id. (noting "[t]he constant declaration of the judges that the question for them is not
one of the mere and simple preponderance of reasons for or against, but of what is very plain
and clear, clear beyond a reasonable doubt").
488. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-54 (1968) (tracing jury trial back to
Magna Carta).
489. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87-89 (1970).
490. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1972).
491. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
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substantial majority" and "a heavy majority."4 ' By analogy, the need to
satisfy a reasonable doubt standard to find a law unconstitutional should
also require at least a three-quarters majority.
4. Supermajorities in the Constitution
The purpose of a supermajority provision is to make action difficult and
thus to hinder the exercise of power. Only in the most compelling of
circumstances, when almost all agree to its necessity, will power constrained
by a supermajority rule be exercised.
The Constitution has many such provisions. The trial of an
impeachment, a most solemn matter, requires "two thirds of the Members
present" to convict. 494 Each House of Congress may "with the Concurrence
of two thirds, expel a Member."4 ' To override Presidential disapproval of a
bill, two thirds of each House must consent.4 " The same is true of "[e]very
Order, Resolution, or Vote."4 " A quorum of two-thirds of the states in the
House or Senate is necessary to resolve a tie or lack of a majority in the
Electoral College.49 ' The President may make treaties "provided two thirds
of the Senators present concur."499 To amend the Constitution, "two thirds
of both Houses" shall propose an amendment, or "two thirds of the several
states" shall apply to call a convention. The proposed amendments shall be
valid if ratified by "three fourths of the several states" or conventions
thereof.oo Ratification of the Constitution required the assent of nine out of
thirteen states, slightly over two-thirds.'01 No person, having taken an oath
as a state or federal officer or legislator who then engaged in the
insurrection shall later hold a state or federal office except by a vote of twothirds of each House of Congress.502 If, after a period of incapacity, the
President declares he is able to discharge his duties, but the Vice President

492. Id. at 362; see also id. at 366 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that "a system
employing a 7-5 standard, rather than a 9-3 or 75% minimum, would afford me great
difficulty").
493. Thayer suggests that the Supremacy Clause may make the calculation differ when
the Supreme Court reviews state laws. Thayer, supra note 485, at 154-55.
494. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
495. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
496. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
497. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
498. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (repealed); amend. XII.
499. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
500. U.S. CONST. art. V.
501. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
502. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 3.
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and designated others disagree, a "two-thirds vote of both Houses" is
necessary to prevent him from continuing in office.'
Supermajority requirements in ten clauses of the Constitution indicate
that this method of ensuring the correctness of a decision, or minimizing
the possibility of error, is an integral part of the constitutional plan. Judicial
repeal of legislation is surely as solemn and significant an event as an
impeachment trial, expulsion of a legislator, override of a Presidential veto,
or ratification of a constitutional amendment.5" The Court has been
described as a "continuing Constitutional convention."0 5 To require a
supermajority of the Supreme Court to void state or federal law would
simply make the Court subject to the same constitutional rigor as the other
branches.
F. Amicus Reform
By amending the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress could require a
citation to the record on appeal for every material fact stated in an opinion.
This simple regulation would curtail the Court's freewheeling appellate factfinding through amicus briefs, and turn it back to being a judicial body,
bound by the testimony and exhibits of record.0 6 The influence of highpowered lobbying groups, able to fund advocacy briefs, should not
predominate, as is typical, over the work product of the litigants. Too often
the case itself is just a pretext for the Court to sort out the policy issues. This
abuse of the judicial role calls for serious reform.
VI. CONCLUSION

The remedies surveyed above provide a toolbox from which Congress
may effectually
address-through legislation
or constitutional
amendment-the unwarranted transformation of the Supreme Court into a
503. U.S. CONsT. amend. XXV, § 4.
504. See supra notes 494, 495,496, 500 and accompanying text.
505. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1970) (Burger, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the Court for making it "dangerously simple for future Courts, using the technique of
interpretation, to operate as a 'continuing Constitutional convention'); Lepre v. Dep't of
Labor, 275 F.3d 59, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Silberman, J., concurring) ("Supreme Court
decisions-particularly in the last century-have resembled more the periodic declarations
of a continuing constitutional convention than efforts to read the Constitution as a body of
positive law."); Philip B. Kurland, Book Review, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 185, 192 (1979) (stating
that "the Great Chief Justice [John Marshall] started the Court on its road to becoming a
council of revision and a continuing constitutional convention").
506. See supra § IV.A.
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third and superior house of Congress. Justice Robert Jackson noted that
"the Constitutional Convention deliberately withheld from the Supreme
Court power that was political in form, such as a forthright power to veto or
revise legislation."1 7 The Court that today routinely exercises a legislative
power of revision, needs to be forced back over the line of adjudication that
separates the constitutional from the legislative. The real issue is not the
existence of judicial review, but the abuse of that power. The Supreme
Court may police the boundaries of the Constitution, but may not, on a
pretext of good police work, assume, as it has done, the power to legislate.as
Adoption of a "clear case" rule would return the Court to its limited
constitutional jurisdiction. The only way structurally to force such a reform
is to adopt a supermajority amendment requiring the assent of threequarters of the Court to invalidate federal or state law. Such a rule, like that
in the Nebraska and North Dakota Constitutions, will reflect the majorities
the Constitution requires to ratify a constitutional amendment. The Court,
habitually acting as a continuing constitutional convention, is incapable of
voluntarily surrendering its assumed legislative authority. Powerful actors
in the political system compete for its favors as a shortcut to desired
results.' Each side believes that with "one more justice," it can swing the
balance in its favor. The legislative suitors that pound daily on the Court's
door need to be driven out of the Temple of Justice, and the mounds of
amicus briefs removed to the dumpster.
"In questions of power, then," said Thomas Jefferson in a memorable
phrase, "let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down
from mischief by the chains of the Constitution."s 0 The Court has broken
free of the existing chains and is running amok in the legislative garden. But
a three-quarters-majority amendment will be a chain not easily broken.

507. Robert H. Jackson, The Supreme Court as a Political Institution, in THE SUPREME
153, 153 (Alan F. Westin ed. 1961).
508. "The distinction between what has been called bench legislation and judicial
interpretation is by a line not easy to be drawn, but necessary to be observed." Letter from
James Madison to David Hoffman (June 13, 1832), in 4 LETTERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra
note 64, at 223.
509. Because the Court is primarily a political actor, and only incidentally a law-finding
institution, "players in the political process will seek to advance their preferences via
Supreme Court nominations." John C. Yoo, Choosing Justices: A Political Appointments
Process and the Wages of JudicialSupremacy, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1436, 1437 (2000).
510. Thomas Jefferson, Draft of the Kentucky Resolutions (1798), in 7 PAUL LEICESTER
FORD, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 1795-1801, at 305 (1896).
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